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PLAYING GOD: THE LEGALITY OF PLANS DENYING SCARCE
RESOURCES TO PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Wendy F. Hensel& Leslie E. Wolf
Abstract
Public health emergencies can arise in a number of different ways.
They can follow a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2004
tsunami, and the recent earthquakes in Haiti and Chile. They may be manmade, such as the September 11 attacks and the anthrax scare. They may
also be infectious. While no pandemic flu has yet reached the severity of
the 1918 flu, there have been several scares, including avian flu and most
recently H1N1.
Few questions are more ethically or legally loaded than determining
who will receive scarce medical resources in the event of a widespread
public health emergency. The answer will often mean the difference
between life and death for affected Americans.
Despite this reality, or perhaps because of it, there has been little
guidance from the federal and state governments on how to prioritize
distribution of those resources among individuals. To fill this gap, some
public health and medical organizations promulgated protocols that set
forth a hierarchy of resource allocation in response to the predicted H1N1
pandemic. Although these efforts at advance planning are to be lauded,
they raise a number of troubling civil rights issues. Several of the protocols
exclude some people with disabilities from receiving care even when their
disabilities do not affect the likely success of the medical interventions at
issue. Both the legality of such plans and the ethical implications of
promoting the health of the community at the expense of people with
disabilities are highly problematic.
This Article explores the legality of the proposed allocation protocols
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act. It also evaluates their compatibility with the ethical principles that
guide public health decisions and discusses their implications for people
with disabilities in the preplanning for public health emergencies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no surprise that people with disabilities are often overlooked or
given short shrift when public health emergencies arise.1 In the best of
1. See NAT‘L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A LOOK BACK AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/hurricanes_impact.pdf (―[P]eople with
disabilities were disproportionately affected by the Hurricanes because their needs were often
overlooked or completely disregarded.‖); Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the
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circumstances, challenges facing this group may be invisible because they
arise out of the implicit assumptions and institutional arrangements that
form the backdrop of daily life.2 The particular challenges that people with
disabilities face in widespread crises, however, can have deadly
consequences. Because of their special needs and, in some cases,
compromised health status, people with disabilities‘ potential for
catastrophic outcomes far exceeds that of more typical Americans.3
Recognizing this, both state and federal legislation directs public health
and emergency officials to take the needs of people with disabilities
explicitly into account when planning for public health emergencies.4 In
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, for example, Congress passed legislation
both detailing the steps necessary to protect the disability community in
times of crisis and directing FEMA to employ a disability coordinator.5
Such efforts demonstrate a societal commitment to ensuring equal access
to services even during a crisis. They also recognize that decisionmaking is
likely to be more just and better reasoned when done deliberately in
anticipation of emergencies rather than in the midst of a full-blown
disaster.6 Advance planning also provides an opportunity for public
Most Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1491 (2009) (noting that special
needs populations, including people with disabilities, are ―often disregarded in [disaster readiness]
initiatives‖).
2. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 187 (2005).
3. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1494, 1496 (noting that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
―[t]he infirm elderly, poor, and disabled were the most likely to die‖ and that people with
disabilities ―are likely to suffer disproportionate harm in disasters‖); cf. Mary Crossley, Becoming
Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53
(2000) (explaining that ―legal protection against discrimination in accessing health care services can
be of critical importance‖ because of the ―ongoing and sometimes extensive health care needs‖ of
people with disabilities).
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 513,
120 Stat. 1394, 1408 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 321b (2006)); see also Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 311, 88 Stat. 143, 150 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2006)) (establishing non-discrimination mandate and
directing authorities to accomplish relief activities without discrimination); Pandemic and AllHazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 102(d), 120 Stat. 2831, 2834–35 (2006)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh–16 (2006)) (identifying the public health needs of at-risk individuals
as a national goal).
6. See, e.g., Asha V. Devereaux et al., Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a
Disaster: A Framework for Allocation of Scarce Resources in Mass Critical Care, 133 CHEST 51S,
52S (Supp. 2008) (―Allocation and rationing of scarce critical care resources are legally, ethically,
and emotionally complex. In the event of a catastrophic event, the lack of a plan to address these
issues will result in the perception of unjust allocation of resources, or actual injustice may take
place.‖); G. Richard Holt, Making Difficult Ethical Decisions in Patient Care During Natural
Disasters and Other Mass Casualty Events, 139 OTOLARYNGOLOGY–HEAD & NECK SURGERY 181,
185 (2008) (arguing it is inappropriate to ask physicians to make decisions regarding triage and
resource allocation during a mass disaster and calling for case-based physician education to prepare
them for such decisionmaking).
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consideration and input, enhancing the potential for equitable outcomes
across society.
To date, however, there has been little guidance from federal and state
governments on the crucial question of how to allocate scarce medical
resources in the event of a widespread public health emergency.7 As one
scholar has noted, this is a ―substantial oversight‖ in national preparedness,
and there is no question that medical professionals will be faced with
difficult life and death decisions as resources become scarce in a
pandemic.8 Some public health and medical organizations have begun to
address these issues independently and, in some cases, to promulgate
allocation protocols that explicitly articulate and defend ethical principles
for resource allocation.9 The overarching goal of these efforts has been to
develop practical, justifiable guidelines that clinicians can implement in
the event of a public health emergency. Such forward-thinking efforts are,
in general, to be applauded.10
Critically, however, they also raise significant concerns about the
equitable treatment of people with disabilities. Value judgments about the
worth and quality of human life have the potential to play prominent roles
in allocation decisions. Because we are a ―culture dominated by standards
created by and for the nondisabled,‖ the potential for bias to enter into the
allocation calculus is high.11 Historically, even those with moderately
limiting disabilities have been viewed with pity and discomfort rather than
as fully functioning human beings worth ―saving.‖12 If allocation protocols
7. Hillary R. Ahle, Anticipating Pandemic Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State
Preparedness Plans Are for the Birds, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 213, 241–42 (2007) (noting
that ―none of the state pandemic plans that exist nationwide discuss helping health care providers
make the tough ethical decisions‖ about the allocation of care in a pandemic).
8. Id. at 248.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Ahle, supra note 7, at 248 (―[T]he responsibility remains to have these
deliberations regarding what will be ethically acceptable before the crowded emergency rooms
become a reality.‖); Michael D. Christian et al., Development of a Triage Protocol for Critical Care
During an Influenza Pandemic, 175 CAN. MED. ASS‘N J. 1377, 1380 (2006) (―A significant lesson
learned during this exercise is that development of a triage protocol is a complex process that
cannot be undertaken during a pandemic.‖); Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1515 (―[S]ociety should
focus significant attention on vulnerable populations during emergency planning processes, when
planners have the leisure of acting without the pressures of time, chaotic conditions, and an extreme
dearth of resources.‖).
11. Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 97, 112 (1994); see also Richard K. Scotch, Models
of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 222
(2000) (―The stigma associated with disability is so embedded and reinforced within our culture and
social structure that it will take tremendous efforts to root [it] out.‖).
12. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE
LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 75 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989) (―‗[N]ormals‘ view the
stigmatized, including the disabled, as ‗not quite human . . . .‘‖ (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963))); Phyllis A. Gordon et al., Attitudes
Regarding Interpersonal Relationships with Persons with Mental Illness and Mental Retardation,
70 J. REHABILITATION 50, 50 (2004) (explaining that ―[a] persistent negative attitude and social
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reflect this same bias, the ability of group members to secure essential
health care during times of crisis may be measurably, perhaps
catastrophically, impacted.
Notably, these concerns are not merely theoretical but are also
evidenced in the allocation protocols promulgated in response to public
health emergencies, such as the recent swine flu pandemic. In 2009, the
President‘s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology created a
possible scenario in which half of all Americans could have been infected
with swine flu during the then-upcoming flu season.13 If such figures
proved accurate, up to 1.8 million of those infected would have required
hospitalization, roughly nine times the typical number of patients
hospitalized with seasonal flu.14 In addition, potentially 300,000 people
could require intensive care.15 These possible numbers indicate that
hospitals could be overburdened and that shortages would occur,
necessitating difficult decisions about who should get access to scarce
medical resources such as ventilators and critical care beds.
Several of the resulting algorithms designed to allocate these resources
during a potential outbreak explicitly exclude patients with particular
physical or mental disabilities from treatment. In some cases, the disability
in question is excluded because it negatively affects the likelihood that the
medical intervention will be successful in the short-term.16 In others,
however, the identified disabilities bear no discernable relationship to
immediate treatment outcomes. Instead, individuals in these categories are
precluded from critical care either because they will need resources for a
prolonged period of use, are deemed to have a poor quality of life posttreatment, or otherwise have a limited long-term prognosis as a result of
their disabilities.17
Although the threat of a swine flu epidemic appears to have diminished
for the time being, there is little doubt that the United States will face
similarly difficult health care allocation decisions at some point in the
future. It is critical to evaluate in advance the legal parameters within
which medical professionals and public health officials must operate when
rejection of people with disabilities is evident throughout history and across cultures‖ and that
―efforts to reduce negative stereotypes . . . do not appear to have been substantially successful‖ in
recent years). The establishment of medical protocols does not escape these concerns because,
classified as scientific inquiry, history is replete with incidences of ―science‖ disguising cultural
bias and discrimination. See, e.g., Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for
Disability Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 920 (2002) (noting that the historical eugenic movement
―claimed the mantle of scientific objectivity but was rife with cultural subjectivism‖).
13. PRESIDENT‘S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA 17 tbl.3-1 (2009)
[hereinafter PCAST], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PCAST_H1N1_
Report.pdf.
14. See Rob Stein, Swine Flu Could Infect Half of U.S.: Presidential Panel’s Estimate Is
First to Gauge Possible Impact of Pandemic, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1.
15. PCAST, supra note 13, at 17 tbl.3-1.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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setting treatment agendas. This Article is a first step in providing guidance
to these individuals as they attempt in good faith to balance the needs of
their communities with the civil rights of people with disabilities in
widespread public health emergencies. Part II of this Article describes the
history of the recent swine flu epidemic and explores the suspect treatment
protocols that have been advanced. Part III provides an overview of both
existing federal antidiscrimination law and statutes relating to public health
emergencies that pertain to people with disabilities, and Part IV evaluates
the legality of the identified treatment protocols under these laws. Finally,
Part V evaluates the ethical implications of establishing treatment
protocols that use disability as a criterion for securing access to medical
care. This Article concludes that the protocols promulgated to date display
a troubling disregard of both the limits imposed by civil rights laws and the
ethical significance of promoting the health of the community at the
expense of people with disabilities.
II. EXISTING PUBLIC HEALTH ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
―Public health‖ is, by definition, concerned with populations rather
than individuals.18 The overarching goal of public health efforts—whether
through laws, governmental or nongovernmental action—is to maximize
the health of the population.19 At its most simplistic, this goal can be
expressed as the ―utilitarian maxim ‗[d]o the greatest good for the greatest
number.‘‖20 However, the reality is much more complex than that. Indeed,
there is debate about what constitutes the ―greatest good‖ and how to
calculate the ―greatest number.‖
A. Ethical Framework for Public Health Decisionmaking
Although there is no single, agreed-upon ethical framework for public
health, there is substantial agreement about the essential principles guiding
public health decisionmaking. First, public health interventions must be
both necessary and effective to address the public health issue.21 Naturally,
public health decisions must sometimes be made before there is complete
information. For example, public health authorities needed to decide
whether to isolate those infected with what later was identified as H1N1
before the virus was identified as a novel flu strain or was fully
understood.22 These principles recognize this uncertainty and require that
18. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16–17 (rev. 2d ed.
2008).
19. Id. at 3–41 (defining essential characteristics of public health law, including public nature
and focus on health of populations).
20. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 385 (4th
ed. 1994). For a description and critique of utilitarian philosophical principles, see id. at 47–55.
21. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27–31 (1905); see also GOSTIN, supra note
18, at 121–37 (analyzing constitutional principles established by Jacobson).
22. Cf. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infections
Among Health-Care Personnel—United States, April-May 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 641, 641, 644–45 (2009) (describing CDC recommendations to health care personnel
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the intervention be necessary and effective based on currently available
information.
Second, public health authorities are obligated to use the least
restrictive alternative intervention available.23 For example, in the case of
H1N1, a hospital may want to require hospital personnel to wear masks to
limit potential flu exposure between patients and staff. However, because
of how flu is transmitted, it would be reasonable to require masks only
within a specified distance of patients rather than at all times.
Third, the benefits and burdens of public health decisions should be
distributed equitably among society.24 The challenge is to determine what
distributions may be considered ―equitable,‖ as there are several different
conceptions of equitable distribution.25 Some argue that benefits and
burdens should be shared equally among individuals, while others argue
that benefits should be distributed according to need.26 These different
conceptions of distributive justice will be described more fully below.
Finally, procedural ethical principles include the requirement for fair
process, which may include commonly recognized due process rights when
public health decisions impose on liberty or economic interests,27 and the
requirement for transparency in decisionmaking.28 Some have argued that
transparency not only requires that decisions and decisionmaking be made
public, but also that public health authorities actively engage the public in
decisionmaking.29
to avoid H1N1 transmission during patient care early in the H1N1 epidemic).
23. See GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 68; Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public
Health, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1776, 1780 (2001).
24. GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 68–69; Kass, supra note 23, at 1780–81.
25. See NAT‘L COMM‘N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 8–9 (1978), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont
.html (explaining that burdens and benefits can be distributed in one of five ways: ―(1) to each
person an equal share, (2) to each person according to individual need, (3) to each person according
to individual effort, (4) to each person according to societal contribution, and (5) to each person
according to merit.‖).
26. See, e.g., id. For a more complete discussion of the ethical principle of justice, see
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 20, at 326–94.
27. GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 131–35.
28. Id. at 70–72; see also James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice
of Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 281–82
(2008).
29. See, e.g., KATHY KINLAW & ROBERT LEVINE, ETHICS SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY COMM.
TO THE DIR., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ETHICAL GUIDELINES IN PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA 3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/panFlu_Ethic_
Guidelines.pdf; Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support During a Public Health
Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation Decision, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
132, 137 (2009). In a recent report regarding environmental assessment, the National Research
Council of the National Academies of Sciences concluded, ―When done well, public participation
improves the quality and legitimacy of a decision and builds the capacity of all involved to engage
in the policy process.‖ PANEL ON PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & DECISION MAKING,
NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION
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This general framework must be further specified to apply to specific
public health issues, such as the allocation of scarce resources during a
public health emergency. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) has developed guidance on this topic.30 Its goal is to identify ethical
points to consider when decisionmakers at all levels prepare their plans.31
Notably, the document does not advocate for a specific allocation scheme
but rather describes ethical principles that are relevant to such
decisionmaking.
Some principles take into account the health of the patients. For
example, emergency departments commonly use the principle ―sickest
first‖ to triage patients who arrive for care. Using this principle, those who
are sickest and require immediate care receive it first. Those who are less
sick must wait, in part because waiting will not adversely affect them in the
long run. One drawback of this approach is that resources may be allocated
to those who are sick enough that they may not survive.32 In contrast,
because of the public health commitment to population health, many
suggest that allocation in a public health emergency should be guided by
the overarching principle of maximizing net benefits and minimizing waste
of resources by allocating to those most likely to survive to hospital
discharge.33 This specification of the general principle seeks to maximize
the number of lives saved.
Conceptualized in a different way, the principle of maximizing net
benefits can account for differences in life conditions of patients. For
example, some have argued that allocations should take into account the
years of life saved in addition to the number of lives saved. This may result
in different allocations based on age (for example, preferring a twentyyear-old over a sixty-year-old, assuming short-term survival is the same) or
based on health conditions (for example, preferring an otherwise healthy
sixty-year-old over a sixty-year-old with underlying health problems).34
The principle can be further specified to seek to maximize quality life
years. Under this conception, life years without disease or disability would

MAKING 2 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008); see also Hodge & Anderson, supra note 28,
281–82 (―Effective outreach to vulnerable populations benefits the community and leads to better
choices by decision makers.‖).
30. The CDC‘s Ethics Subcommittee to the Advisory Committee to the Director, the author of
the guidance, is a committee comprised of academics and professional ethicists who provide advice
to the CDC on a broad range of public health ethics issues. Drue H. Barrett et al., Strengthening
Public Health Ethics at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT.
& PRACTICE 348, 350 (2008).
31. VENTILATOR DOCUMENT WORKGROUP FOR THE ETHICS SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY
COMM. TO THE DIR., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
DECISION MAKING REGARDING ALLOCATION OF MECHANICAL VENTILATORS DURING A SEVERE
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OR OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 3 (2010), available at
www.gha911.org/csc/docs/ethicalconsiderations.pdf.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. See id. at 12–13.
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be favored over those with disease or disability.35 Thus, all other things
being equal, those who are otherwise healthy would get preference over
those who suffer from underlying disease or disability under this variation
of the principle.
Yet another variation of this principle is the life cycle principle. Under
this concept, ―each individual [should have an] equal opportunity to live
through the various phases of life.‖36 Accordingly, a child would get
preference over a forty-year-old, all other things being equal, because the
forty-year-old has already passed through some life cycles (i.e.,
adolescence, young adulthood) that the child has not. This principle clearly
favors younger people over older people.37 However, this preference is
based on life stages rather than age alone and thus may not resolve
allocation decisions among people who are within the same life stage (for
example, a thirty-five-year-old and a forty-year-old).
Another principle commonly invoked for allocation of scarce resources
is that of fair chances. There are multiple ways in which this principle can
be specified. For example, resources may be distributed on a first-come,
first-served basis. Using this principle, those who are in need of medical
resources receive them, regardless of condition, as long as the resources are
available. Accordingly, in an epidemic, those who become sick earlier will
have the best chance of receiving the resources. Like the sickest-first
principle, using the first-come, first-served principle may lead to resources
being used by people who may not survive.38 Alternatively, resources may
be distributed based on random selection, for example, by lottery. Again,
there are choices as to how to conceive of ―fair chance.‖ Each person may
have an equal chance or weighting can be incorporated to take into account
condition (for example, everyone with a 50% chance of survival will have
the same chance of receiving a ventilator, but those with a 75% chance of
survival might be twice as likely to receive a ventilator than those with a
50% chance of survival).39
Finally, some have argued that allocation of scarce resources should be
based on some conception of social worth. One conception of social worth
that has support in public health, at least in some cases, is instrumental
value. This principle grants preference to those whose services are essential
35. Id. at 13. The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) and disability-adjusted life year (DALY)
have been used as a measure of health outcome in cost effectiveness analysis for decades. Franco
Sassi, Calculating QALYs, Comparing QALY and DALY Calculations, 21 HEALTH POL‘Y & PLAN.
402, 402 (2006). Although both methods attempt to take into account disease burden, their
underlying assumptions and methods are different, and thus, measurements may differ. Id. at 402–
03, 407. Moreover, as the CDC Ethics Subcommittee noted, calculation of either measure for
individual patients would be challenging in the context of a public health emergency. VENTILATOR
DOCUMENT WORKGROUP FOR THE ETHICS SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., supra
note 31, at 13.
36. VENTILATOR DOCUMENT WORKGROUP FOR THE ETHICS SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY
COMM. TO THE DIR., supra note 31, at 14.
37. Id. at 14–15.
38. Id. at 8–9.
39. Id. at 15.
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to community service and thus have a ―multiplier effect.‖ That is, more
lives are saved if these individuals remain healthy and are available to
work. For example, public health and healthcare personnel may be
prioritized for flu vaccines because their services are essential to
responding the public health emergency and treating patients. In contrast,
the CDC Ethics Subcommittee indicated that this principle did not justify
prioritizing public health and health care personnel for ventilator allocation
because someone sick enough to require ventilation is unlikely to return
quickly to the workforce.40 A broader conception of social worth focuses
on overall value to society rather than instrumental value. This principle
was notoriously used by the Seattle Dialysis Committee in giving
preference to ―professionals, heads of families, and caregivers,‖ and has
largely been rejected as a guiding principle given the inherent biases of
such evaluations.41
The principles identified by the CDC Ethics Subcommittee come from
philosophical discussion, but they also have intuitive moral appeal. They
are consistent with decisions people make daily (for example, in shortages,
parents often feed children before themselves). Despite this intuitive
appeal, there is no agreement about what should be the governing
principle. Indeed, people accept multiple principles and may give priority
to different ones depending on the specific factual circumstances. Given
this reality, some have argued that allocation decisionmaking ought to take
into account multiple principles, although weighting those principles may
be challenging.42
Even if there is agreement regarding the governing principle or
principles, implementing allocation decisions in accordance with those
principles typically requires additional specification.
B. Specific Allocation Proposals
One arena in which several groups have sought to move from the
general principles described above to specific articulated criteria is the
allocation of critical care medicine, such as ventilators. Unlike the CDC‘s
guidance document, these efforts are directed at recommending specific
allocation strategies in the hope they will be adopted if needed.
1. The Task Force for Mass Care
The Task Force for Mass Care of the American College of Chest
Physicians published its recommendations for guiding ventilator
distribution in 2008.43 The Task Force was comprised primarily of medical
professionals, including thirty physicians and four registered nurses. The
40. Id. at 13–14.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 15–16; White et al., supra note 29, at 134–36.
43. Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 51S. In addition to the allocation system, the document
addresses operational requirements for allocating ―scarce critical care resources‖ and for the triage
process itself. Id.
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remaining members included one attorney, two members with Bachelor of
Science degrees and one member with a doctorate degree. Members came
primarily from the United States, with some members from Canada and the
United Kingdom.44
The triage algorithm the Task Force proposed ―is designed to be
objective.‖45 It is based on several underlying principles, which are
generally consistent with the general principles articulated above. In
particular, the Task Force assumed that (1) triage will only occur after all
attempts at increasing supply (for example, canceling elective surgeries)
have been undertaken; (2) limits on ventilator access will be proportional
to the actual shortage of resources; (3) ―rationing of critical care will occur
uniformly, be transparent, and abide by objective medical criteria;
(4) rationing should apply equally to withholding and withdrawing lifesustaining treatments[;] . . . and (5) patients not eligible for critical care
will continue to receive supportive medical or palliative care.‖46 According
to the Task Force criteria, only patients who require active critical care
interventions should be eligible for critical care during a crisis.47
The Task Force exclusion criteria are intended to preclude patients
from care ―when they have a very high risk of death, little likelihood of
long-term survival, and a correspondingly low likelihood of benefit from
critical care resources.‖48 The exclusion criteria are based on ―the
Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score‖ and an evaluation of
―the severity of chronic illness.‖49 A patient is excluded on the basis of the
SOFA score if she has a minimum of 80% risk of mortality, with the
assumption that this predicted level of mortality indicates a high likelihood
of imminent death even with medical care.50 The Task Force also
specifically excludes individuals with certain conditions from receiving
critical care during a mass crisis, including ―[s]evere baseline cognitive
impairment,‖ ―[a]dvanced untreatable neuromuscular disease,‖ and
44. Id. at 64S.
45. Id. at 53S.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 56S.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 56S–57S. The SOFA score is expected to be calculated daily as an assessment of
acute inpatient illness severity. Id. at 57S. It evaluates functioning of multiple organ systems and,
because most ICU patients die of multiorgan failure, is predictive of in-hospital mortality. See
Flavio Lopes Ferreira et al., Serial Evaluation of the SOFA Score to Predict Outcome in Critically
Ill Patients, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 1754, 1756–58 (2001). The Task Force chose this assessment
over others because ―(1) it primarily assesses daily organ function; (2) the ease of obtaining
physiologic parameters; (3) the ease of calculating the SOFA score; (4) simple laboratory tests are
used for scoring; and (5) its validation in a wide variety of critical care conditions.‖ Devereaux et
al., supra note 6, at 57S. It also has the benefit of not including potentially problematic variables,
such as age, in the calculation. See White et al., supra note 29, at 133. Conditions that affect organ
function but may also be considered disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act will
affect the SOFA score. This may cause the disabled to have a lower chance of getting access to
resources during an emergency, but it does not systematically exclude them from access.
50. Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 57S.
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―[a]dvanced and irreversible neurologic event or condition.‖51 Notably, the
Task Force neither defines these conditions nor indicates which specific
conditions fall into these three categories.
2. The Hick Group
A group of physicians primarily from Minnesota (the ―Hick Group‖)
also has proposed a protocol for allocating ventilators during a public
health emergency.52 As with the Task Force, the Hick Group starts with
fundamental ethical principles that are consistent with the general
principles articulated earlier. The Hick Group defines its overarching goal
as allocating ―facility resources to those likeliest to benefit, taking into
consideration: [m]edical prognosis[, u]nderlying disease[, e]xpected
duration of resource need[, d]uration of benefit[, and] quality of life after
intervention.‖53 The group acknowledges that quality of life considerations
are ―unfortunately a criteria subject to significant bias and interpretation.‖54
Within these parameters, the Hick Group focuses on three key criteria
for evaluating a patient for critical care services during an emergency: ―[(1)
o]rgan system function (and severity of impairment)[; (2) d]uration of
ventilator use and duration of benefit[,]‖ taking into account current and
underlying disease parameters; and ―[(3) r]esponse to a trial of mechanical
ventilation.‖55 Unlike the Task Force criteria, which specified both SOFA
scores and criteria for most of the excluding conditions, the Hick Group
matrix is more qualitative than quantitative. For example, although the
Group suggests that a ―[h]igh potential for death‖ based on an organ
system function core like SOFA may require ventilator reallocation, it does
not define that phrase.56 Its matrix also lists ―[e]xamples of underlying
diseases that predict poor short-term survival‖ that support ventilator
reallocation, including ―immunodeficiency syndromes with evidence of
opportunistic . . . infection‖ and ―acute and chronic and irreversible
neurologic impairment that makes patient dependent for all personal care
(for example, severe stroke, congenital syndrome, persistent vegetative
state, and severe dementia).‖57
3. The Ontario Working Group
The steering committee of the Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza
Pandemic requested the formation of the Ontario Working Group, which
51. Id. at 60S tbl.6.
52. John L. Hick et al., Clinical Review: Allocating Ventilators During Large-Scale
Disasters—Problems, Planning, and Process, 11 CRITICAL CARE 1 (2007), http://ccforum.com/con
tent/pdf/cc5929.pdf.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 6 fig.1.
57. Id. at 6 fig.1 n.b. HIV/AIDS is one prominent example of an immunodeficiency
syndrome. Basic Information About HIV and AIDS, DEP‘T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm (last modified Aug. 11, 2010).
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was comprised of ―clinicians with expertise in critical care, infectious
diseases, medical ethics, military medicine, triage, and disaster
management.‖58 The Working Group conducted an extensive literature
review to develop a prototype triage protocol. Critical care leaders within
Ontario reviewed and commented on the Working Group‘s report before it
was made final.59 Like the other groups, the Working Group relied on
general ethical principles in developing its protocol with the intent of
providing a ―practical, user-friendly and flexible‖ guide to decisionmaking
in a pandemic.60
The Working Group‘s protocol, like that of the Task Force, relies
heavily on the SOFA score. A patient who has a SOFA score of greater
than eleven or meets exclusion criteria is excluded from critical care.61
According to the Working Group,
[The exclusion criteria] can be broken down into [three]
categories: patients who have a poor prognosis despite care in
an ICU, patients who require resources that simply cannot be
provided during a pandemic and patients with advanced
medical illnesses whose underlying illness has a poor
prognosis with a high likelihood of death, even without their
current concomitant critical illness.62
Like the Task Force, the Working Group specifically excluded critical care
during a pandemic to people with ―[s]evere baseline cognitive impairment‖
and ―[s]evere and irreversible neurologic event or condition.‖63 The
rationale for excluding these patients appears to take into account the
resources that would be required, even though such patients might benefit
from care.
4. The NY Workgroup
The New York State Department of Health and the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law established the New York State
Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic (NY
Workgroup).64 The NY Workgroup included experts in medicine, law, and
ethics.65 The NY Workgroup developed an ethical framework that included
the following principles: ―[d]uty to care[; d]uty to steward resources[;
d]uty to plan[; d]istributive justice[; and t]ransparency.‖66 It proposed
58. Christian et al., supra note 10, at 1377.
59. Id. at 1378.
60. Id. at 1380.
61. Id. at 1378 fig.1.
62. Id. at 1378.
63. Id. at 1379.
64. Tia Powell et al., Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster, 2 DISASTER MED.
& PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 20, 20 (2008).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21.
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allocation based on medical/clinical factors alone, using a combined
evaluation based on the Ontario Working Group and SOFA.67 It also
excluded those with severe irreversible neurological events or conditions if
they have ―high expected mortality,‖ although this phrase is not defined.68
III. FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES
Allocation protocols promulgated by public health or medical groups
are governed by and must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution, federal
statutes, and state law. The following discussion identifies those federal
laws that may control protocol provisions to the extent they affect people
with disabilities. It concludes with a review of federal legislation relating
to public health emergencies to determine whether these laws may be
abridged or suspended during times of national crisis.
A. Federal Disability Laws
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that no state shall ―deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,‖69 a mandate that also extends to the federal
government.70 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean
that ―all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.‖71 In general,
courts will uphold challenges to legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause so long as ―the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.‖72 The Court has applied heightened
scrutiny, however, to classifications based on race, national origin,
alienage, and sex because such ―factors are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest,‖ and instead, often reflect
outdated notions or discriminatory animus.73
To date, the Supreme Court has declined to add people with disabilities
to the list of suspect classes. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, the Court concluded that the rational basis test—not heightened
scrutiny—was sufficient to protect the interests of people with mental
retardation. The Court reasoned that the impairment ―is a characteristic that
the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of
decisions,‖ and that ―both State and Federal Governments have recently

67. Id. at 22–23.
68. Id. at 23 tbl.1.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying the Due Process Clause to the
federal government).
71. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
72. Id. at 440.
73. Id. at 440–41. Classifications based on race, national origin, or alienage are subject to
strict scrutiny and are upheld only ―if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.‖
Id. at 440. Classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny and are upheld only
where they are ―substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.‖ Id. at 441.
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committed themselves to assisting the retarded.‖74 Although the Court
could conceivably extend heightened scrutiny to other disabilities,75 few
could exceed the documented history of discrimination, exclusion, and
institutionalization faced by people with mental retardation.76 As a result, it
is unlikely that the Equal Protection Clause would provide meaningful
protection to people with disabilities in advance planning for public health
emergencies.
Instead, the primary legal protection afforded to this group arises out of
federal legislation. Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act broadly preclude discrimination against
people with disabilities on the basis of their impairments.77 Congress has
made clear that the ADA is intended to address continuing discrimination
facing group members in the ―critical area[] . . . [of] health services.‖78
All public hospitals and service providers are covered under Title II of
the ADA, which precludes states, local governments, and their agents from
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in the
provision of any service, program, or activity.79 A ―qualified individual
with a disability‖ is one who, ―with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity.‖80 The reference to ―any service,
program or activity‖ of the state is generally construed broadly to include
―anything [that] a public entity does.‖81
The regulations define discrimination to include providing ―an aid,
benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level

74. Id. at 446.
75. Some scholars have argued that in enacting the ADA in 1990, Congress intended ―to
mandate a heightened level of judicial scrutiny in cases dealing with a classification based on
disability‖ pursuant to its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Lisa A. Montanaro,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the Hint? Congress’ Attempt to Raise the
Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 623–25 (1995).
76. The Court itself suggested as much, noting that ―if the large and amorphous class of the
mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it
would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others.‖ Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 445.
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182 (2006) (ADA Titles II and III); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)
(§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
79. Id. § 12132.
80. Id. § 12131(2); see also Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (―An
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program‘s requirements in spite of his
handicap.‖).
81. Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 732
(9th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.102 (1998)).
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of achievement‖ as that provided to people outside of the protected class.82
The regulations also prohibit the imposition or application of
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or any class of individuals with
disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service,
program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to
be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or
activity being offered.83
Although the statute permits criteria that are necessary for the ―safe
operation‖ of a program, such requirements ―must be based on actual risks
and not on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals
with disabilities.‖84 Providers likewise must make reasonable
modifications to policies for this group unless doing so would
fundamentally alter the nature of the good or service being provided.85 This
affirmative defense takes into account both ―fiscal and administrative
considerations that factor into program restrictions.‖86 Although
individuals may sue for compensatory damages based on intentional
discrimination in some circumstances,87 there is no equivalent action for
disparate impact claims.88
Many of these same provisions are included in Title III of the ADA,
which regulates all ―public accommodations,‖89 including nonreligious90
private hospitals and professional service providers.91 Public
accommodations may not deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity
―to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
82. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) (2010).
83. Id. § 35.130(b)(8). Notably, even criteria that ―indirectly prevent or limit‖ the ability of
people with disabilities to participate in or benefit from a service are precluded by the regulation. 28
C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130 (DOJ Interpretative Guidance).
84. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130 (DOJ Interpretative Guidance). Unlike Title III, Title II
does not statutorily recognize a ―direct threat‖ defense. The Department of Justice, however, has
interpreted ―essential eligibility requirements‖ to incorporate this concept. See Preamble to Title II
Rules, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, §§ 35.104, 35.130 (2010).
85. Id. § 35.130(b)(8).
86. Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Managed Care, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1223 (2000).
87. For a discussion of the remedies available under Title II and Title III, see Michael
Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1807, 1859–65 (2005).
88. Id. at 1824.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
90. Title III‘s exemption of religious entities and organizations is ―very broad, encompassing
a wide variety of situations.‖ 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.104 (2010). A religious entity‘s use of a
lay board does not automatically remove this exemption. Instead, courts will scrutinize all facts to
determine ―whether the church or other religious organization controls the operations . . . of the
service or whether the . . . service is itself a religious organization.‖ Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (identifying the ―professional office of a health care provider,
hospital, or other service establishment‖ as public accommodations); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e).
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advantages, or accommodations‖ of the entity or provide unequal benefits
on the basis of disability.92 Like Title II, Title III specifically prohibits
using ―eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out‖ individuals
with disabilities from the full benefit of the entity‘s services, unless such
criteria are ―necessary for safe operation.‖93 Reasonable modifications to
policies and procedures again must be provided unless doing so would
constitute a fundamental alteration of the entity‘s goods or services.94
Nevertheless, the statute permits public accommodations to deny or limit
the participation of an individual with a disability ―when that individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others,‖ defined as a
significant risk that cannot be eliminated by modifying policies or
providing auxiliary aids and services.95 To secure the benefit of this
exception, the provider ―must make an individualized assessment, based on
reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge.‖96
Notably, Title III specifically precludes administrative methods that
have a disparate impact on people with disabilities.97 Public
accommodations, directly or through contractual arrangements, are
prohibited from employing ―standards or criteria or methods of
administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of
disability, or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common administrative control.‖98 Nevertheless, there is no private right
of action for damages under Title III, although in some circumstances, the
Department of Justice may seek damages and other civil penalties.99
The precursor to the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, overlaps
the protection afforded by the Titles II and III to a large extent.100 This
statute provides that ―[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability‖ be
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(a)–(b). The Department of Justice
has explained that:
Full and equal enjoyment means the right to participate and to have an
equal opportunity to obtain the same results as others to the extent possible
with such accommodations as may be required by the Act and these
regulations. It does not mean that an individual with a disability must achieve
an identical result or level of achievement as persons without a disability.
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.201.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
95. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a)–(b).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c).
97. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.204 (stating that this section ―incorporate[s] a disparate
impact standard to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative mandate to end discrimination‖ and is
consistent with Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), discussed infra Part IV.C).
98. 28 C.F.R. § 36.204; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); see also Waterstone, supra note 87, at 1868, 1873.
100. See Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 271, 303 (2005)
(―The regulations that have been promulgated to enforce the ADA in the government programs and
services arena are virtually identical to the § 504 . . . regulations.‖).
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discriminated against in any program or activity that receives federal
financial assistance.101 It defines ―program or activity‖ to include all of the
operations of ―an entire corporation, partnership, or other private
organization, or an entire sole proprietorship‖ that ―is principally engaged
in the business of providing . . . health care.‖102 Because most hospitals
receive federal support and federal aid is likely to be far-reaching in the
event of a major pandemic, it is likely that many, if not most, health care
providers would fall within the reach of this statute. Requested
modifications must be reasonable and need not be provided where they
would either pose a direct threat to safety or constitute an undue burden or
fundamental alteration.103 Significantly, monetary damages are available
for statutory violations where the defendant has demonstrated ―deliberate
indifference‖ to the civil rights of the plaintiff.104 As a result, it is likely
that most litigants would include a § 504 claim when seeking relief for the
denial of health care on the basis of disability.
B. Public Health Laws Relating to Disability
Public health authority traditionally is exercised by the states through
their historical police powers, reserved to the states through the Tenth
Amendment.105 Although the federal government exerts substantial
authority over public health matters, it must do so through its enumerated
powers, primarily the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and Spending
Clause.106 Public health powers are quite broad; courts historically have
upheld significant restrictions on personal liberty to further public health
goals, including mandatory vaccination and involuntary hospitalizations
intended to protect the public from infectious diseases.107
These already expansive powers may be increased in the face of a
public health emergency, which can spring from infectious diseases,
natural disasters, environmental threats, or man-made threats, including
bioterrorism.108 Although the source of the threat varies, all of these events
101. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
102. Id. § 794(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2006); see Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410–12 (1979).
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1); Eyer, supra note 100, at 291 (describing damages available
under § 504); see also Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
the ―deliberate indifference‖ standard).
105. See GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 77–80, 91–95; Michael Greenberger & Arianne Spaccarelli,
State and Federal Emergency Powers, in HOMELAND SECURITY: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 21, 23
(Joe D. Whitley & Lynne K. Zusman eds., 2009).
106. See generally GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 98–106; Gene W. Matthews et al., Legal
Authorities for Interventions in Public Health Emergencies, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE
262, 263–64 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2007).
107. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 19 (1905) (upholding mandated
smallpox vaccinations); City of N.Y. v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(upholding detention order for treatment of tuberculosis); see also GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 376–
95 (discussing compulsory vaccinations).
108. See Greenberger & Spaccarelli, supra note 105, at 21–41; Matthews et al., supra note
106, at 262–83.
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present a serious health threat to a large number of people at the local,
regional, or even global level.109 As described more fully below, to respond
to such threats, federal, state, and local governments have the power to
declare a public health emergency, which gives them additional authority
and allows them to suspend the operation of other laws that might interfere
with an effective response to the emergency.110 However, as the following
analysis suggests, currently no laws would suspend the requirements of the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act in a public emergency.
1. Statutes Relating to Public Health Emergencies
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) authorizes the federal government to provide assistance to
state and local governments during disasters.111 For purposes of the
Stafford Act, ―emergency‖ is defined broadly to encompass:
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination
of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to
protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
States.112
Declarations of emergency under the Stafford Act generally are made
only following the request of a governor of a state affected by the
emergency or major disaster.113 However, the President may declare an
emergency without a governor‘s request when ―the primary responsibility
for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a
subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority.‖114

109. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 6–8 (2003).
110. Matthews et al., supra note 106, at 268–69; see GOSTIN, supra note 18, at 9–10; see also
Hodge & Anderson, supra note 28, at 253–71.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2006); Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and
Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1921 (2008).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a). This feature of the Act was dramatically illustrated in the
Hurricane Katrina case in which there was confusion over the role of the federal government in
relief efforts and what specific assistance had been requested by the Louisiana governor.
Greenberger & Spaccarelli, supra note 105, at 23.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b). The President also has the authority to declare an emergency under
the National Emergencies Act. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006)). Unlike the Stafford Act, this statute does not specify the
circumstances under which an emergency can be declared or indicate any specific need to protect
vulnerable persons during the emergency. This may be because it comes under the War and
National Defense title of the United States Code rather than the Public Health title.
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Importantly, the Stafford Act prohibits discrimination in responding to
an emergency. It provides:
The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such
regulations as may be necessary for the guidance of personnel
carrying out Federal assistance functions at the site of a major
disaster or emergency. Such regulations shall include
provisions for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the
processing of applications, and other relief and assistance
activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial
manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color,
religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency,
or economic status.115
Nondiscrimination is likewise a prerequisite to participation by other
governmental bodies and organizations (for example, the Red Cross) in
federal relief efforts.116
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
may declare a public health emergency under the Public Health Threat and
Emergencies Act based on ―a disease or disorder‖ that threatens public
health.117 The Secretary is then authorized to take ―such action as may be
appropriate.‖118 Declaration of an emergency grants access to a Public
Health Emergency Fund and lasts ninety days, unless the Secretary
terminates it earlier or renews it. As part of the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, Congress also directed the Secretary to ―oversee the
implementation of the National Preparedness goal of taking into account
the public health and medical needs of at-risk individuals in the event of a
public health emergency.‖119 Specific responsibilities include ensuring that
state and local grant recipients take into account the needs of ―at-risk
individuals,‖ defined to include ―children, pregnant women, senior citizens
and other individuals who have special needs in the event of a public
health emergency.‖120
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 authorizes ―accelerated approval of priority
countermeasures,‖ which permits a designation of a drug for fast-track
status under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or a device for priority
review, even without company request and even over its opposition.121 It
also permits the emergency waiver of some legal requirements to facilitate
115. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (emphasis added).
116. Id. § 5151(b).
117. Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-505, § 319, 114 Stat.
2315, 2315 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2006)).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 247d.
119. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 2814, 120 Stat.
2831, 2834 (2006).
120. Id. at 2836.
121. Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, § 122, 116 Stat. 598, 613 (2002) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356-1 (2006)).
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care when the President or the HHS Secretary has declared a public health
emergency.122 These include the waiver of sanctions under the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires hospitals
with emergency departments to screen and, if needed, stabilize all patients
presenting at the hospital with an emergent condition.123 Waiving this
requirement in a public health emergency recognizes that it may be more
efficient and effective to designate certain hospitals—or even other
locations—for specific responses (for example, concentrate experts in the
infectious condition in a couple of locations). Similarly, the Act permits
alteration of Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children‘s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) provider eligibility requirements, such as in-state
licensure, to expand access to medical providers.124
In 2004, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13,347
concerning individuals with disabilities in emergency preparedness.125 The
purpose of the policy is ―[t]o ensure that the Federal Government
appropriately supports safety and security for individuals with disabilities
in situations involving disasters.‖126 As articulated by the Interagency
Coordinating Council in its 2005–2006 Progress Report, the Executive
Order ―[recognizes] that individuals with disabilities should be as safe and
secure in their communities and work environments as individuals without
disabilities.‖127 It requires U.S. government departments and agencies to
―consider, in their emergency preparedness planning, the unique needs
of . . . individuals
with
disabilities
whom
the
agency
serves; . . . encourage . . . consideration‖ of those needs by state and local
governments and private organizations; and help implement emergency
preparedness plans in this regard.128 To facilitate attention to these issues,
the Order establishes the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency
Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities.129
In sum, federal emergency preparedness and response law reflects a
commitment to equal access, even in the context of an emergency. The
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not contain exceptions for
emergencies. Thus, their provisions would apply to allocation of scarce
resources during a public health emergency.

122. Id. § 143, at 627 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2006)) (adding a new § 1135 to the
Social Security Act). These include participation requirements for individual health care providers,
in-state provider licensure requirements, and some sanctions. Id. at 628.
123. Id. at 627–28; see also Hodge & Anderson, supra note 28, at 257.
124. Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, § 143, at 627;
see also Matthews et al., supra note 106, at 269.
125. Exec. Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,573 (July 22, 2004).
126. Id.
127. INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COUNCIL ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXECUTIVE ORDER
13,347 PROGRESS REPORT, JULY 2005—SEPTEMBER 2006 4 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/icc-0506-progressreport.pdf.
128. Exec. Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,573.
129. Id.
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2. Application to Federal Antidiscrimination Laws
There are several reasons to believe that the legal waivers permitted by
the public health statutes described above do not and will not affect the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. First, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the
federal government has taken several steps to strengthen the government‘s
response to the needs of disabled individuals in the event of a public health
emergency. Executive Order 13,347 in particular requires federal agencies
to consider the needs of individuals with disabilities in their emergency
preparedness plans, directing both the HHS Secretary and a recently
established ―disability coordinator‖ to ensure this goal.130 Congress‘s clear
endorsement of antidiscrimination in public health emergencies strongly
suggests that it is unlikely to waive the legal protection afforded to this
group in a time of limited resources.
Second, there is no provision in the ADA or Rehabilitation Act that
authorizes waiver of its requirements during a public health emergency.131
Congress‘s silence in this regard is instructive, given that several other
federal statutes explicitly include such waiver provisions. The Social
Security Act and the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, for example, expressly
authorize waiver of EMTALA, Medicare/Medicaid eligibility, and drug
approval requirements in an emergency.132 These exemptions share a
common purpose—they are directed at facilitating access to medical care
in times of crises.133 Had Congress desired to include a similar waiver in
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, which clearly applies to the provision
of care, it could easily have done so.134

130. 6 U.S.C. § 321b (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,573. The Disability
Coordinator shall be appointed only ―[a]fter consultation with organizations representing
individuals with disabilities, the National Council on Disabilities, and the Interagency Coordinating
Council on Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities.‖ 6 U.S.C. § 321b(a). The Disability
Coordinator is ―to ensure that the needs of individuals with disabilities are being properly addressed
in emergency preparedness and disaster relief.‖ Id.
131. See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1522–26 (analyzing application of the ADA in a public
health emergency).
132. Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, § 143, 116 Stat. 594, 627 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2006)); see also
Hodge & Anderson, supra note 28, at 257; Matthews et al., supra note 106, at 269.
133. For example, the EMTALA waivers allow both concentration of expertise and separation
of cases in a pandemic. See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 28, at 280. The waivers of FDA
regulations permit access to experimental therapies. Matthews et al., supra note 106, at 269.
134. This is particularly true given that Congress amended the ADA as recently as 2008. For a
detailed discussion of these changes, see Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The Impact of the
ADA Amendments on Schools and Universities, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (2009). For an
analysis of the congressional intent in enacting the ADA, see generally Mark C. Weber,
Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119 (2010).
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IV. THE LEGALITY OF USING DISABILITY AS A FACTOR IN
ALLOCATING SCARCE RESOURCES
The legislation discussed above reflects the government‘s commitment
to equality of opportunity for people with disabilities in even the most
demanding of circumstances. The provision of health services is subject
both to anti-discrimination laws and to judicial scrutiny even in times of
public health emergencies.135 This understanding, however, does not
answer the question of how these laws affect specific aspects of the
allocation protocols. The following discussion addresses this complex
inquiry with respect to categorical preclusions of care and care limitations
based on duration of need, quality of life considerations, and medical
effectiveness. It concludes by evaluating the affirmative defenses that may
apply under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
A. The “Otherwise Qualified” Requirement
In order to contest any condition identified in the allocation protocols
under § 504 or Title II of the ADA, an individual with a disability must
first establish that he is ―qualified‖ so as to fall within the protected
class.136 In contrast, Title III simply precludes discrimination against all
individuals on the basis of disability.137 The absence of the qualified
requirement is misleading, however, because the antidiscrimination
provisions of Title III ―implicitly recognize a public accommodation‘s
freedom to enforce eligibility requirements for its services, so long as those
criteria do not screen out or tend to screen out persons with disabilities.‖138
As a result, class coverage under Title III in practice is conceptually
analogous to that under Title II and the Rehabilitation Act.139 In all cases,
plaintiffs will need to show that they are qualified for the service in
question and meet all necessary eligibility criteria.
Although seemingly straightforward on its face, the qualified
requirement has proven challenging in some cases involving the denial of
medical care.140 In United States v. University Hospital, the Second Circuit
found it significant that the ―‗otherwise qualified‘‖ element of § 504
requires eligibility for a program ―‗in spite of‘‖ any underlying
disability.141 From this fact, it concluded that ―section 504 prohibits
135. See Anderlik & Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 1194, 1245 (noting that there is no ―safe
harbor‖ provision in the ADA for medical decisionmaking, unlike that provided in the statute for
insurance).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
138. Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REV. 179,
246 (1995).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Daniel J. Smith, Discrimination in Provision of Medical Services on the Basis of
Disability, 49 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (1998) (concluding that, ―By needing medical
services, a disabled person is generally qualified to receive the service of any health care provider
licensed to provide those particular services.‖).
141. United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Doe v. N.Y.
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discrimination . . . only where the individual‘s handicap is unrelated to, and
thus improper to consideration of, the services in question.‖142 Reasoning
that ―it is typically the handicap itself that gives rise to, or at least
contributes to, the need for services,‖ the court concluded that the
―otherwise qualified‖ requirement cannot be meaningfully applied in cases
involving the denial or withholding of medical treatment.143 As a result, if
there is a relationship between the underlying disability and the treatment
being sought, ―it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a
particular decision was ‗discriminatory.‘‖144
A number of courts since University Hospital have affirmed this
understanding of ―otherwise qualified‖ and refused to consider challenges
to the denial of medical care.145 Others, however, while acknowledging
that they should normally defer to professional medical judgment in
assessing the qualified requirement, nevertheless conclude that ―[a] strict
rule of deference would enable doctors to offer merely pretextual medical
opinions to cover up discriminatory decisions.‖146 Accordingly, if the
individual‘s underlying disability is seemingly unrelated to the treatment
being sought, these courts will evaluate the legitimacy of the denial of care
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.

Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 157.
145. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493–94 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that
plaintiffs challenging medical team‘s policy of recommending the withholding of treatment from
infants with more severe spina bifida were not ―otherwise qualified‖ under § 504 because the term
was inapposite to medical treatment decisions). The Tenth Circuit acknowledged, however, that the
―otherwise qualified‖ language could be satisfied where ―the treatment is completely unrelated to
the . . . handicapping condition.‖ Id. at 1494 n.3; see also Fitzgerald v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 403
F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (denying treatment claim where disability was the reason for
seeking medical treatment); Grzan v. Charter Hosp., 104 F.3d 116, 121 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
plaintiff not ―‗otherwise qualified‘ because, absent her handicap, she would not have been eligible
for treatment in the first place‖); Bolmer v. Oliveira, 570 F. Supp. 2d 301, 327 (D. Conn. 2008)
(same); Lesley v. Chie, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223 (D. Mass. 2000) (collecting cases); cf. Cushing v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1109 (2d Cir. 1992) (―[T]he rehabilitation act does not create a cause of
action based on a handicap that is directly related to providing the very services at issue.‖).
146. Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991); see also Johnson, 971 F.2d at
1494 n.3 (concluding, in dicta, that the ―otherwise qualified‖ condition of § 504 may be satisfied
where a condition has ―no relation‖ to the medical treatment sought); Sumes v. Andres, 938 F.
Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding plaintiff ―otherwise qualified‖ where she was denied prenatal
care because she was deaf); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381, 1389–90 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(holding that an individual ―with a disability is ‗otherwise qualified‘ for medical benefits if there is
no factor apart from the mere existence of disability that renders the participant unqualified for the
benefit‖); Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990) (permitting a cause of action
against physician who refused to perform surgery because of patient‘s HIV, holding that while,
―The inquiry is complicated . . . by the fact that HIV status may be relevant to a determination of
whether surgery is advisable . . . the determination of such subtle questions of intent and motive is a
well-traveled [judicial] road.‖).
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If a court adopts this approach, at least some of the individuals with
disabilities affected by the protocols would likely satisfy the otherwise
qualified requirement. Many who seek health care during a pandemic are
likely to do so for reasons relating to the pandemic generally rather than
their underlying disability specifically. Individuals with ―severe baseline
cognitive impairments‖ infected with influenza, for example, may have no
underlying condition that specifically relates to or affects their need for a
ventilator. If a medical provider nevertheless refuses to provide this care
because of the underlying disability, the otherwise qualified requirement
would seem to be satisfied, enabling courts to evaluate the legitimacy of
the refusal.
Some courts have gone further, moreover, to conclude that individuals
with disabilities may be ―otherwise qualified‖ even when there is a
relationship between the patient‘s disability and services being sought.147
In the case of In re Baby K, for example, a hospital sought to withhold
ventilator treatment from an infant with anencephaly against the mother‘s
wishes because of medical futility.148 The hospital argued that Baby K was
not ―otherwise qualified‖ to receive the treatment because she only
required ventilation because of her disability. The court rejected this
position, reasoning that ―[j]ust as an AIDS patient seeking ear surgery is
‗otherwise qualified‘ to receive treatment despite poor long term prospects
of living, Baby K is ‗otherwise qualified‘ to receive ventilator treatment
despite similarly dismal health prospects.‖149 In essence, because the
ventilator would resolve the infant‘s immediate breathing problems,
withholding it on the basis of longer-term medical futility constituted
discrimination on the basis of disability.
The Third Circuit took a similar approach in a case involving the denial
of an Alzheimer‘s patient‘s access to a nursing home. The lower court
concluded that she was not ―otherwise qualified‖ under § 504 because she
would not need access to the nursing home but for her disability.150 As a
result, ―she sought a benefit because of her handicap and not in spite of it,‖
thus rendering the Rehabilitation Act inapplicable.151 The appellate court
rejected this conclusion, reasoning that this interpretation of otherwise
qualified, if ―taken to its logical extreme,‖ would mean that ―no program,
service or institution designed specifically to meet the needs of the
handicapped would ever have to comply with section 504 because every
applicant would seek access to the program or facility because of a
handicap, not in spite of it,‖ contradicting ―both the statutory and
regulatory framework of section 504.‖152 The court concluded that the
focus of § 504 should not be on why a plaintiff sought access to a program,
147. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1024–25 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d on other
grounds, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1995).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1028.
150. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1005, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1010.
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but instead on why the plaintiff was denied access to it.153 To the extent
that courts agree with this more liberal interpretation, individuals with
disabilities seeking health care services pursuant to the protocols should be
able to easily establish that they are qualified within the meaning of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Categorical Exclusion of People with Disabilities from
Critical Care
Against this background, the categorical exclusion of individuals with
specific disabilities from some scarce resources during a pandemic would
almost certainly qualify as discrimination on the basis of disability. Such
provisions facially tie access to health care to status per se. If the individual
possesses the identified condition, all avenues to securing care are
completely closed, and there is no individualized inquiry made into either
the severity of the underlying disability or its impact on the individual in
need of care. Policies that preclude entire categories of disabilities from
receiving services are among ―the most transparent forms of
discrimination‖ and violate the ADA on their face.154
The case of Alexander v. Choate is instructive here, although involving
a disparate impact claim.155 The plaintiffs challenged a Medicaid plan that
imposed a fourteen-day annual limit on Medicaid-covered hospitalization.
The plaintiffs argued that such limitations would have a disparate impact
on people with disabilities because of their greater need for health care and,
as such, violated the Rehabilitation Act‘s anti-discrimination provision.
The Supreme Court agreed that the Rehabilitation Act requires people with
disabilities to be ―provided with meaningful access‖ to the benefits offered
by the state.156 It does not, however, require the state to offer substantively
different benefits to individuals with disabilities simply because they have
a greater need for them.157 The Court upheld the restriction because the
Medicaid provision did
not invoke criteria that have a particular exclusionary effect
on the handicapped . . . [and did] not distinguish between
those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose
coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait
153. Id.
154. Anderlik & Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 1223; see also MX Grp., Inc. v. City of
Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 342 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding blanket prohibition in zoning ordinance
constituted a per se violation of Title II of the ADA).
155. 469 U.S. 287, 290 (1985). The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding the issue, that
―§ 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the
handicapped.‖ Id. at 299. Notably, the legislative history to the ADA cited Choate as ―the definitive
interpretation of section 504 that [Congress] intended [T]itle II to copy.‖ Mark C. Weber, Disability
Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1089, 1115 (1995).
156. Choate, 469 U.S. at 289–90, 301.
157. See id. at 303–04.
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that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting
or less likely of having.158
In a footnote, the Court found it significant that the plan did not limit the
number of days ―to only particular handicapped conditions and takes effect
regardless of the particular cause of hospitalization.‖159
Protocols that categorically exclude individuals with specific
disabilities from receiving medical care in the event of a pandemic clearly
do not meet the ―meaningful access‖ standard articulated in Choate. Unlike
the restrictions upheld by the Court, these provisions erect absolute barriers
to health services for the individuals so identified and are not neutral on
their face. By definition, there can be no meaningful access when all access
is precluded as a matter of course. Because these protocols refuse treatment
on the basis of disability status per se, they are unlawful under the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act in the absence of a viable defense.
Other courts have applied Choate to reach similar conclusions in cases
involving the preclusion of specific disabilities from health care programs.
In Lovell v. Chandler, for example, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the State of Hawaii could permissibly exclude the aged, blind, and disabled
from participating in an experimental HMO program because their
inclusion would result in a lack of predictability and cause health care
insurers to refuse to participate in the new plan.160 The court rejected the
state‘s argument that such restrictions were necessary to the viability of the
program, reasoning that ―the plain language of the regulations prohibits a
state from‖ excluding people with disabilities from a program ―unless it
provides them with benefits ‗as effective as those provided to others.‘‖161
Because the state provided no benefits at all to this group, the court
concluded that the plan violated Title II of the ADA.162 By the same token,
the complete absence of benefits afforded to individuals with particular
disabilities in the protocols suggests they likewise violate federal
antidiscrimination laws on their face.
In response to such concerns, it is likely that proponents of the plans
would point to precedent suggesting that medical treatment decisions are
not cognizable under these statutes.163 In some cases, this objection has
158. Id. at 302.
159. Id. at 302 n.22.
160. 303 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2002).
161. Id. at 1055.
162. Id. at 1044, 1055; see also Burns v. Chandler, 939 F. Supp. 765, 766–67 (D. Haw. 1996)
(holding that Hawaii‘s pilot program changing from a fee for service to a managed care plan
categorically excluded the blind and disabled because plaintiffs were not offered the option to
participate in a separate, equal program but instead were categorically excluded); Anderlik &
Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 1197 (suggesting that In re Baby K stands for the proposition that ―no
condition-based treatment limitation is permissible under federal anti-discrimination law unless the
case is one of absolute physiological futility or the limitation is at the request of a patient or
surrogate‖).
163. See, e.g., Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (―[A] lawsuit under the
Rehab Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be based on medical treatment
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been addressed in the context of the ―otherwise qualified‖ debate discussed
earlier.164 In others, the argument is stated more categorically that the
statutes simply do not apply to medical treatment decisions.165 This
position is not surprising in light of courts‘ understandable reluctance to
second-guess complicated decisions made by health professionals in their
area of expertise. While cases involving a firm refusal to treat may be
straightforward, claims of disparate treatment will often require inquiry
into the realm of professional judgment and result in a battle of experts.166
Because medical treatment decisions in most circumstances necessarily
must account for the existence and effects of an individual‘s disability, it is
strained to conclude that such consideration constitutes unlawful
discrimination ―because of‖ disability.
The logic of these cases, however, would seem inapposite to an
evaluation of the legality of protocols promulgated in advance of a
pandemic, particularly those which categorically preclude access to care.
Notably, the Supreme Court has recognized that ―a hospital rule or state
policy denying or limiting [meaningful] access [to medical services] would
be subject to challenge under § 504.‖167 Still, other courts have reasoned
decisions.‖); Fitzgerald v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex
rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005); Wilson v. Woodford, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12330, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2006); see also Robert J. Moossy, Jr., Comment,
Health Care Prioritization and the ADA: The Oregon Plan 1991-1993, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 322
(1994) (―[M]edical data and professional judgments based on that data are probably outside of the
scope of the Title II of the ADA because they are medical treatment decisions . . . .‖).
164. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 403 F.3d at 1144 (concluding that plaintiff was not ―‗otherwise
qualified‘ for such treatment in the absence of his alleged disability—his alleged disability in this
case was the reason why [he] was seeking medical treatment‖); Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 838
F. Supp. 201, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding plaintiff failed the ―otherwise qualified‖ test because his
―handicapping condition, HIV infection, is exactly the same condition for which he seeks medical
attention‖).
165. See, e.g., Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1294 (―The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, was never
intended to apply to decisions involving the termination of life support or medical treatment.‖);
United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that ―[i]n view of [the]
consistent congressional policy against the involvement of federal personnel in medical treatment
decisions, we cannot presume that congress intended to repeal its earlier announcements‖ through
passage of § 504); Lesley v. Chie, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D. Mass. 2000) (―Section 504 is not
meant to apply to medical treatment decisions.‖); Toney, 838 F. Supp. at 203 (agreeing that
―medical treatment decisions . . . are nonreviewable under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act‖). As
Dean Mary Crossley has noted, ―an attempt to draw clear lines around the concepts of benefit,
denial based on disability, and qualification of a disabled individual is doomed to failure, or at least
to severe confusion. . . . [S]ome overlap in the discussion is inevitable.‖ Crossley, supra note 138,
at 214–15.
166. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 3, at 63; see also Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157 (finding
that medical treatment decisions are entitled to deference because, ―[I]t would invariably require
lengthy litigation primarily involving conflicting expert testimony to determine whether a
decision . . . was based on a ‗bona fide medical judgment,‘ however that phrase might be defined.‖).
167. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass‘n, 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986). The Supreme Court specifically
declined to answer the question of ―whether § 504 ever applies to individual medical treatment
decisions involving handicapped infants.‖ Id.
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that while courts may not overturn medical decisions, § 504 ―properly
permits an inquiry into whether a medical decision is ‗a bona fide medical
judgment,‘ or whether handicap has improperly been taken into
account.‖168 As such, there would seem little basis for the sweeping
conclusion that all medical treatment decisions are insulated from federal
review.
Moreover, a meaningful distinction can be drawn between the cases
declining judicial review and the protocol provisions at issue. The cases
declining to review medical treatment decisions generally require scrutiny
of professional judgment rendered to a specific individual without
predetermined limitations as to what care may be provided.169 Because the
professional‘s decision pertains to and can be evaluated in the context of a
particular patient and his actual need for treatment, it is necessarily based,
at least to some extent, on an individualized determination as mandated by
the ADA. It may be that once this threshold is crossed, the legitimacy and
reasonableness of medical decisions are most appropriately evaluated in
the context of state tort law and professional standards of care, rather than
in the context of antidiscrimination laws.170
In contrast, sweeping policies that preclude or significantly limit entire
categories of people with disabilities from receiving medical care in
advance of actual need necessarily are based on generalizations concerning
status. Their legitimacy depends on whether scientific evidence establishes
that no individual in the excluded class could possibly qualify for or
benefit from the medical treatment at issue, or whether the exclusionary
criteria is actually based on prejudicial stereotypes and myths. It is
precisely this type of inquiry that Congress intended to reach through the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and such policies should be subject to
judicial review.171
168. Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at
162 (Winters, J., dissenting)).
169. See, e.g., Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (prisoner alleging
inadequate medical care for his diabetes); Fitzgerald, 403 F.3d at 1144 (equating plaintiff‘s claim
for relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as one for alleged medical negligence and thus
not cognizable); Grzan v. Charter Hosp., 104 F.3d 116, 122–23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the
―institutional treatment decision‖ in University Hospital ―a closer case‖ under § 504 than the
individual mistreatment by the defendant physician, which essentially ―alleges malpractice‖);
Lesley, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (finding no cause of action where plaintiff challenged physician‘s
decision to transfer plaintiff to a different facility to treat her); Toney, 838 F. Supp. at 204
(concluding that ―a medical doctor may [not] be subject to a lawsuit under § 504 for refusing to see
a regular adult patient every time he or she desires‖). But see Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487,
1493–94 (10th Cir. 1992).
170. Cf. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (―[I]t would be . . . odd to
suppose that disabled persons whose disability is treated negligently have a federal malpractice
claim by virtue of the [ADA], whereas a sick or injured but not disabled person . . . must be content
with the remedy that the state law of medical malpractice provides.‖).
171. See, e.g., Anderlik & Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 1240 (―Rather than exempting medical
decisions . . . from review, or making medical judgments themselves, courts might scrutinize
coverage distinctions for the standard forms of discrimination, asking whether . . . a distinction
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The significance of the distinction between individualized and
predetermined categorical limitations on medical treatment is exemplified
by the treatment of a woman with Down syndrome who sought a heart and
lung transplant in the 1990s.172 Physicians initially refused to place her on
a waiting list for a transplant because of a general assumption that all
individuals with Down syndrome ―lacked the mental capacity to survive
the post-transplantation regimen.‖173 They took no account of the fact that
she was a disability activist who had lived independently since the age of
twenty.174 Upon considering the issue, the U.S. Department of Justice
indicated that the physicians‘ actions could have violated the ADA because
the denial was based on her diagnosis rather than an individualized
assessment of her actual abilities.175 Once that assessment was made, the
physicians ultimately placed the woman on the transplant list, and she
received donor organs within days.176 Although the courts never considered
the case, it suggests that federal antidiscrimination laws apply to medical
protocols that categorically deny treatment on the basis of disability even
when disability may be relevant to the treatment decision. It also
demonstrates how the deference due to medical treatment decisions is
rendered less significant when categorical policy exclusions are in place.
Unlike individual treatment decisions, courts will not always need to enter
the world of complex medical judgments in order to render a legal
decision.
The breadth of the excluded categories in the pandemic protocols
supports this argument, as well as the conclusion that they implicitly are
based, at least in part, on unlawful assumptions. There is no scientific
precision, for example, to the term ―severe baseline cognitive
impairments.‖ Individuals with a broad range of functioning could
conceivably fall within this category, ranging from those in a persistent
vegetative state to those with Down syndrome, schizophrenia, or
Alzheimer‘s disease.177 In light of this variability, any generalized
conclusion about their categorical ability to qualify for or benefit from
critical care would seem highly suspect. It is equally true, moreover, that
there can be a great deal of diversity among individuals with even the same
disability.178 Although some individuals with cystic fibrosis may be
reflects myths or stereotypes about a particular disability or neglect of or indifference to the needs
of individuals with a . . . disability.‖).
172. Crossley, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing case).
173. Id.
174. Angela T. Whitehead, Rejecting Organs: The Organ Allocation Process and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 481, 481 (1998).
175. Crossley, supra note 3, at 65.
176. Id.
177. Notably, there is no such category identified in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, better known as the DSM-IV. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS‘N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
178. See Karen J. Merrikin & Thomas D. Overcast, Patient Selection for Heart
Transplantation: When Is a Discriminating Choice Discrimination?, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL‘Y & L.
7, 18 (1985) (―[P]ersons sharing a particular type of handicapping condition often do not share the
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unlikely to achieve a favorable outcome if ventilation is provided, for
example, others may have the potential to survive for many years with
additional treatment. Because the exclusions are based on a generalized
diagnosis rather than the individual‘s potential health outcomes, they
suggest an assessment of the value of the lives to be saved rather than
viability of specific treatment interventions—a consideration that clearly
implicates and is governed by the ADA.
Proponents are nevertheless likely to argue that no disparate treatment
claim is cognizable under the ADA because some individuals with
disabilities will receive medical treatment pursuant to the protocols. It
would seem likely that many, if not most, individuals admitted to a hospital
with life-threatening illnesses during a pandemic could qualify as
―disabled‖ under the relaxed definition promulgated in the amended
ADA.179 Because the majority of people with disabilities will receive, or at
least qualify for, medical treatment pursuant to the protocols, they cannot
be said to discriminate on the basis of disability.180
The Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, however,
indicated that the ADA reaches both the uneven treatment of individuals
with disabilities in relation to the able-bodied and the differential treatment
among class members based on the nature or severity of the disability.181
This is consistent with courts who have concluded that ―discrimination
claims [are] actionable, even if it is only between members of a protected
class.‖182 Given that there are clear distinctions made between disabilities
same level of debilitation.‖).
179. For a detailed discussion of the changes made to the disability definition, see Hensel,
supra note 134, at 654–58 (2009). In particular, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission‘s
proposed regulations providing that an impairment may be substantially limiting even if relatively
short-term in nature suggests that individuals in a pandemic may, by virtue of being sufficiently ill
to require a ventilator, qualify as disabled. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,440 (Sept. 23, 2009) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(v)) (―An impairment may substantially limit a major life
activity even if it lasts, or is expected to last, for fewer than six months.‖).
180. See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549–50 (1988) (finding that ―nothing in the
Rehabilitation Act . . . requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons
also must be extended to all other categories of handicapped persons,‖ but acknowledging that it
would ―arguably‖ be discriminatory to differentiate between disabilities ―according to generalized
determinations that lack any substantial basis‖); see also Anderlik & Wilkinson, supra note 86, at
1235–39 (surveying cases).
181. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999) (finding case actionable
despite the fact that the plaintiffs identified no comparison class that was afforded preferential
treatment); see also Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury Cnty., 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 937 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (―[E]xclusion of all persons with a specified disability, whatever the degree, from
benefits provided to other disabled persons [does not] excuse discrimination by reason of that
particular disability.‖); McNally v. Prison Health Servs., 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 57–59 (D. Me. 1999)
(finding disparate treatment where prison system had a distinct and ineffective drug distribution
program for HIV-positive prisoners).
182. Salcido, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 937 (discussing Olmstead); see also Mark H. v. Lemahieu,
513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that ―evidence that appropriate services were provided to
some disabled individuals does not demonstrate that others were not denied meaningful access
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in the protocols that may effectively mean the difference between life and
death, courts should find these claims reviewable under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.
C. Exclusions Based on Likely Duration of Care Needed
In addition to, or in lieu of, identifying specific disabilities to exclude
from care, some protocols have used the patient‘s likely duration of need
for the scarce resource as a factor in allocation decisions.183 The longer the
patient is likely to need the intervention, such as a ventilator, the less likely
he or she is to receive it in the first instance. At least one protocol
explicitly recognizes that this assessment is ―likely to involve more
subjective interpretation of data and [is] thus more fraught with ethical
peril.‖184 The duration of need criteria is nevertheless defended as
necessary ―[b]ecause the conditions under which the triage process will be
triggered implies a severe limitation of resources, [and] a single patient
who remains in an ICU for an extended period may use resources that
could save the lives of several other patients.‖185 Accordingly, the question
becomes whether facially neutral duration of care considerations are
permissible under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
The Choate opinion once again is instructive here. The Supreme Court
made clear that while a disparate impact claim may be cognizable under
the Rehabilitation Act, it does not obligate the government ―to minimize
the negative effects of its decisions on persons with disabling conditions‖
in every instance.186 There, the record presented no evidence indicating that
conditions ―uniquely associated‖ with disabilities ―or occurring with
greater frequency among them [could] not be effectively treated‖ within
the coverage limitation.187 As a result, the Court upheld the limitation,
concluding that it would provide those both with and without disabilities
―with identical and effective hospital services fully available for their use,
with both classes of users subject to the same durational limitation.‖188
Choate‘s reasoning suggests that neutral durational limits on resources
in times of crisis may be upheld in some circumstances even if they
disproportionately affect people with disabilities. The critical inquiry will
be whether the duration of care limitation provides an equal or meaningful
‗solely on the basis of their disability‘‖ (quoting Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1053–54 (9th
Cir. 2002))); cf. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 273 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that ―[w]e
follow our fellow circuits, and the suggestions of the Olmstead plurality, in concluding that‖
plaintiffs do not need to ―identify a ‗comparison class‘ of ‗similarly situated individuals given
preferential treatment‘‖ in order to state a claim under the ADA (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at
598)).
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. Hick et al., supra note 52, at 6.
185. Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 57–58; see also Christian et al., supra note 10, at 1379
(establishing ―a ceiling on the amount of resources that can be expended on any one person‖ as ―the
third component of the triage protocol‖).
186. Weber, supra note 155, at 1116.
187. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 n.22 (1985).
188. Id. at 302.
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opportunity to obtain the same benefit or results as offered to non-disabled
individuals.189 The concept of ―meaningful access‖ in this context,
however, is not at all clear. In some instances, courts have found access to
be meaningful if any kind of access is provided190 or access is at least
theoretically available on the same basis to both the able-bodied and
disabled.191 These courts do not scrutinize whether individuals with
disabilities actually are able to benefit from the good or service in the form
in which it is offered. Under this logic, duration of need considerations in
allocation protocols would likely be permissible because they are facially
neutral and do not curtail all access to care by people with disabilities. In
light of the reality that courts are traditionally reluctant to intrude into
medical decisionmaking, this approach may be attractive to the judiciary.
There are also courts, however, which equate ―meaningful‖ with
―adequate‖ in some respects and scrutinize the practical effect of the
exclusionary criteria.192 Although courts have declined to ―define precisely
the severity of the deprivation that a plaintiff must experience . . . [in
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (2010) (―[A]ids, benefits, and services . . . are not required to
produce the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons,
but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same
benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement.‖).
190. See Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessible to All, 14 STAN. L. &
POL‘Y REV. 389, 399–404 (2003) (detailing case law on this issue); Alexander Abbe,
Comment,“Meaningful Access” to Health Care and the Remedies Available to Medicaid Managed
Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1190–97
(1999) (same); see also Hunsaker v. Contra Costa Cnty., 149 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that ―disparate impact discrimination is actionable only if it involved a denial of
‗meaningful access‘ to public benefits‖); Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 528 F. Supp. 2d
553, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that Housing Choice Voucher Program was meaningfully
accessible because the ―core services‖ were available to all participants even though program
ignored reality that accessible housing was in short supply and was ―less than ideal‖).
191. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 478 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding access to
free parking meaningful where disabled and nondisabled had equal access to it, even though
plaintiff was unlikely to benefit from such access); Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611, 618
(2d Cir. 1999) (―The ADA requires only that a particular service provided to some not be denied to
disabled people.‖).
192. See Abbe, supra note 190, at 1194; Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating
Alexander v. Choate: “Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 466–73 (2008); Paradis, supra note 190, at 400–01; see also Am. Council
of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that blind plaintiffs stated a
claim that they lacked meaningful access to U.S. currency because it is provided ―in a format
readable only by the sighted‖); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 275 (2d Cir. 2003)
(clarifying that courts‘ focus should be on ―whether the plaintiffs with disabilities could achieve
meaningful access, and not whether the access the plaintiffs had (absent a remedy) was less
meaningful than what was enjoyed by others‖); Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.
2001) (―A violation of Title II . . . does not occur only when a disabled person is completely
prevented from enjoying a service, program, or activity.‖); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480,
1484 (9th Cir. 1996) (―Although Hawaii‘s quarantine requirement applies equally to all persons
entering the state with a dog, its enforcement burdens visually-impaired persons in a manner
different and greater than it burdens others.‖).
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order] to demonstrate a denial of meaningful access,‖193 they will
scrutinize whether the access is sufficient to address the needs in question.
These courts make a careful distinction between a request for additional
substantive benefits and a reasonable modification to make the provided
benefit accessible.194 The resolution of this distinction will often turn on
the way in which the benefit is defined. While ―adequate health care‖ is too
amorphous to be actionable as per Choate,195 the more narrowly tailored
―adequate ventilator use‖ may prove to be acceptable.
Following this line of reasoning, the durational limits would be
discriminatory to the extent that their practical effect is to erect a
significant hurdle between people with disabilities and scarce resources
during a health emergency. If evidence suggests that individuals in the
excluded categories have the potential to benefit from ventilator use but
because of their disability ―cannot be effectively treated‖196 within the
established durational limits, Choate would suggest such limitations are
actionable under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II. Disability advocates
may plausibly argue that they are not seeking additional substantive
benefits, but instead a reasonable modification—an extension of time—to
facilitate meaningful access to the same benefit—a ventilator. This
approach is consistent with the legislative history of the ADA, which
makes clear that people with disabilities are entitled to ―an equal
opportunity to obtain the same results as others.‖197 An extension of time
would seem to be a reasonable modification absent a showing that it would
constitute a fundamental alteration or undue hardship. Where an equal
result is readily achievable but is not permitted for reasons related to the
individual‘s disability, it would be difficult to conclude the access is
meaningful in the normal sense of that word. As one scholar aptly stated,
―That a person‘s disability deprives her of equal odds is tragic enough,
without compounding that misfortune by denying her equal access to
potentially beneficial medical care.‖198
Further complicating the matter, the durational limits at issue in the
protocols are not fixed and thus are unlikely to be uniformly applied.
Whether or not the individual‘s projected duration of use will preclude her
from access to care will depend on a medical provider‘s assessment of her
condition. Such variability permits subjective notions about the worth of
life with disabilities to play a potentially significant role in allocating care.
193. Paulson, 525 F.3d at 1269.
194. See Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000).
195. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
196. Id. at 302 n.22; see also Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Choate in support of its conclusion that the closure of the Rehabilitative Center foreclosed
―meaningful access‖ to health care for individuals with disabilities because these services ―cannot
currently be provided effectively anywhere in the County system‖).
197. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 478; H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(IV), at 57, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 546 (1990) (―[I]ndividuals with
disabilities must be afforded an equal opportunity to attain substantially the same result.‖).
198. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491,
516 (1995).
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An otherwise healthy child‘s need to use a ventilator for fourteen days may
seem a justified use of resources. The same duration of need in an adult
with severe mental retardation may seem insupportable. Inevitably, the lifeand-death decisions about who should receive care will be based in part on
the characteristics of the individuals who will otherwise go without. In the
absence of clear guidance as to how much time is too much time, the
degree of discretion provided by vague durational considerations is highly
problematic. Because it may be difficult, if not impossible, to establish
static durational limits in the context of an ongoing and fluid pandemic,
there may be no way to incorporate durational limits into protocols without
either inadvisably restricting the discretion of medical providers or running
afoul of antidiscrimination laws.
Ultimately, whichever approach is adopted by the courts, the legitimacy
of durational limits will depend on the extent to which evidence supports
the connection between the individual‘s disability and likely need for
prolonged care. Where there is no meaningful connection between the two,
durational limits by definition are not necessary to an effective response in
a pandemic. Problematically, however, any meaningful evidence in this
regard will be virtually impossible to secure in advance. The earliest
responders in particular will be operating in the absence of complete
information in a pandemic. As such, the potential for durational limits to
be imposed in a discriminatory way is problematically high, counseling
against their implementation.
D. Exclusions Based on Quality of Life Considerations
Some of the protocols allocate scarce resources among pandemic
patients based on the medical professional‘s assessment of the individual‘s
anticipated quality of life after treatment. Individuals with functional
impairments post-treatment will be less likely to receive treatment in the
first instance regardless of whether their disability preexists or is a
consequence of the treatment. The question becomes whether
consideration of quality of life, either as a component of identifying
specific disabilities for exclusion or as a general consideration for
precluding care, is consistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The State of Oregon similarly attempted to ration health care in the
early 1990s based on quality of life considerations. The subsequent Oregon
Health Care Plan, designed to provide comprehensive health care to all
citizens, included both managed competition and a prioritized benefits
package to limit costs.199 The state identified and ranked a list of
reimbursable conditions by using a complex formula based on both ―the
medical outcomes of treatment and the perceived quality of life related to
each outcome,‖ with emphasis given to the latter.200 In part, the quality of
199. See ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 397 (1994)
(describing the Oregon Plan).
200. Id. at 401 (quoting Letter from Thomas J. Marzen & Daniel Avila, Nat‘l Legal Ctr. for
Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., to the Honorable Chris Smith, U.S. Representative (Dec. 5,
1991) [hereinafter Letter from Marzen & Avila, Dec. 5]).
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life component was assessed through public opinion polls weighing the
―acceptability or distaste for particular functional limitations.‖201
In order to implement the plan as developed, Oregon was required to
first secure several Medicaid waivers from the federal government. The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services initially denied the
waivers, however, because of its belief that the plan‘s prioritization of
treatment based on quality of life considerations violated the ADA.202 HHS
was particularly concerned with the state‘s use of public opinion polls to
rank the desirability of potential treatments. Because public opinion is very
likely influenced by the myths, stereotypes, and prejudices attached to
disability, such polls are likely to overemphasize the impact of functional
limitations and underestimate the quality of life of individuals with such
limitations.203 Empirical research confirms that people who neither are
disabled nor have a disabled family member consistently overestimate the
burdens of living with a disability.204
Oregon thereafter submitted a revised plan that omitted quality of life
considerations. The altered plan prioritized treatments based in part on
professional medical judgment of the patient‘s likely outcome, looking to
the patient‘s ―‗residual effects (symptoms) because of or in spite of
treatment.‘‖205 An outcome was deemed to be ―favorable‖ if the treatment
was able both to ―maintain life and to preserve or to restore an individual
to an ‗asymptomatic‘ state.‖206 Treatments that left individuals in a
―symptomatic‖ state were less likely to be funded by the state.207
Oregon submitted the second plan for HHS approval, which HHS
denied again.208 HHS was concerned that the concept of ―symptom‖ was
201. Id. at 408 (quoting Letter from Thomas J. Marzen & Daniel Avila, Nat‘l Legal Ctr. for
Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., to the Honorable Chris Smith, U.S. Representative (Dec.
17, 1991) [hereinafter Letter from Marzen & Avila, Dec. 17]).
202. Id. at 405 (―By utilizing these discriminatory assessments to determine a treatment‘s net
benefit, the plan discriminates on the basis of disability in an inappropriate manner.‖ (quoting Letter
from Marzen & Avila, Dec. 5, supra note 200)).
203. Id. at 403–05.
204. See Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized
Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1708 (2008)
(noting that the difference in quality of life ratings has been demonstrated for paraplegia, visual
impairment, heart disease, asthma, dialysis, and living with a colostomy and concluding that, ―The
overarching conclusion is that people fail to envision their own capacities to adapt to declines in
health.‖); Peter A. Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies
Between Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY LIFE RES. 599,
599–600 (2003) (noting that the ―discrepancies suggest that either the public does not understand
how valuable life can be for people with disabilities or that people with disabilities consciously or
subconsciously overstate their‖ health-related quality of life).
205. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 199, at 414 (quoting Letter
from Thomas J. Marzen & Daniel Avila, Nat‘l Legal Ctr. for Medically Dependent & Disabled,
Inc., to the Honorable Chris Smith, U.S. Representative (Jan. 11, 1993)).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 414–15.
208. Id. at 422 (referring to Letter from Timothy B. Flanagan, Assistant Attorney Gen. to
Susan K. Zagame, Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. (Jan. 13, 1993)).
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another term for ―disability,‖ thus again implicating the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.209 HHS encouraged the state to resubmit the plan,
however, explaining that consideration of ―‗medical effectiveness‘‖ may be
permissible where the state did not ―take into account changes in
individuals‘ functional limitations as a result of treatment.‖210 Some
scholars have concluded that this approach confirms that the state may
value a treatment‘s ability to prevent death but effectively cannot consider
―the effectiveness of treatment for non-lethal conditions.‖211
Although no court has ever considered the legitimacy of the plan, its
history suggests that ―any methodology that would intentionally ration
health care resources by associating quality of life considerations with
disabilities does not comport with the mandate of the ADA.‖212 As HHS
correctly noted, quality of life considerations are not ―neutral‖ even when
couched in mathematical terms and are very likely to be driven by
prejudices and stereotypes concerning the desirability of life with
disabilities. There is no question that the use of such criteria in allocation
protocols will result in the systematic denial of emergent care to
individuals with disabilities. Disabilities may impair current functioning,
diminish lifespan, and generally create challenges that are not experienced
by more typical Americans—all factors that would be evaluated in a
quality of life consideration. By favoring those with no functional
impairments, the protocols implicitly endorse the belief that the lives of
individuals without disabilities are more valuable than that of their
unfortunate counterparts. This is precisely the kind of biased judgment that
is precluded by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and the stakes could
not be higher. Resolution of this factor will often mean the difference
between life and death in a public health emergency.
Notably, the treatment of the second Oregon plan suggests that the
ADA, in setting treatment priorities, does not distinguish between quality
of life judgments made by the public and those made by medical
professionals. Some have argued that this distinction is untenable, citing
the Supreme Court‘s admonition in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline that ―courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical
judgments of public health officials‖ when making findings of medical
fact.213 ―Because [allocation] decisions involve the medical judgments of
administrative officials in their area of expertise they should be‖ upheld so

209. Id. at 421–22. Such a concern is not unreasonable given that ―[f]or medicine and public
health, disease and disability is the problem to solve‖ and eradication is part of the ―professional
mission.‖ Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and
Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1649, 1650 (1999).
210. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 199, at 423 (quoting HEALTH
CARE FIN. ADMIN., 11-P-90160/0-01, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS REGARDING THE OREGON
PLAN (1993)).
211. Moossy, supra note 163, at 310.
212. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 199, at 411.
213. 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
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long as they are exercising their judgment in good faith in a reasonable
manner.214
As history has demonstrated, however, medical professionals are not
immune to the societal bias towards life with disabilities. For example, in
the 1990s, well into the AIDS epidemic, one study ―found that twentythree percent of U.S. medical residents ‗indicated that they would not care
for persons with AIDS if they had a choice.‘‖215 In prenatal genetic
diagnosis, health care professionals focus on negative aspects, including
the ―burden‖ on the family, of having a child with Down syndrome.216 The
eugenics movement, moreover, was advocated by physicians in the name
of ―science‖ and bettering society.217 There is significant evidence that an
assessment of quality of life by any nondisabled individual will
systematically undervalue the quality of life with disabilities, particularly
mental disabilities, whether or not the individual in question is a medical
provider.218 As Dean Mary Crossley has explained, ―a physician‘s qualityof-life value judgment remains just that—a subjective value judgment that
may be infected with stereotypic assumptions regarding the value of life
with a severe disability.‖219
In part, the problem of bias arises because of the very dominance of the
medical model of disability. If medicine can alleviate some of the
symptoms of the disorder, the physician‘s identification of disability is less
likely to deprive a patient of intensive, life-sustaining treatment.220 The
214. Moossy, supra note 163, at 317.
215. Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal Obligations to Treat During
an Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 667 (2007) (quoting study by the American Civil Liberties
Union AIDS Project). Although such results could be on account of ―prejudicial attitudes towards
people with HIV/AIDS,‖ the ―fear of becoming infected with AIDS, not prejudice, was the
compelling factor for physicians who wanted to deny treatment.‖ Id. However, by the 1990s, it was
well-known in the medical community that HIV/AIDS was not casually transmitted and that health
care workers using CDC recommended precautions with all patients were highly unlikely to be
infected through their work. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650–52 (1998); Abbott v. Bragdon,
163 F.3d 87, 89–90 (9th Cir. 1998).
216. Jan M. Hodgson et al., “Testing Times, Challenging Choices”: An Australian Study of
Prenatal Genetic Counseling, 19 J. GENETIC COUNSEL 22, 29 (2010) (―[T]here was no overt
encouragement [in any discussion] of clients to deliberate about the possibility of having a child
with a disability.‖). This study is consistent with earlier research in which nurses and genetic
counselors (but not parents) viewed a film about families raising children with Down syndrome and
found the film ―unrealistic‖ and ―too positive.‖ Asch, supra note 209, at 1654.
217. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 57, 58–61 (2008) (discussing history of eugenics movement).
218. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 138, at 224–25 (―Particularly apparent in some of the
medical commentary is the devaluation of the lives of persons whose disability affects their
neurological functioning.‖); see also Halpern & Arnold, supra note 204, at 1708.
219. Crossley, supra note 138, at 225; see also Developments in the Law—Medical
Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1636 (1990) (―Experience indicates that if
physicians are forced to choose among people in the allocation of scarce medical resources, they
will choose people most like themselves and exclude those who they deem ‗unworthy.‘‖).
220. This is exemplified by the tort of wrongful birth and wrongful life. See, e.g., Mary Terrell
White, Making Responsible Decisions: An Interpretive Ethic for Genetic Decisionmaking, 29
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impact of societal discrimination and external barriers to a ―meaningful‖
life are simply not considered in this analysis.221 The causal focus of this
inquiry is the disability in isolation rather than in the context of family,
community, and the individual as a whole person. It does not acknowledge
the potential richness that life may hold for those with even the most
severe defects.222
Notably, some would argue that a more categorical approach is
appropriate in the context of a public health emergency. As one protocol
explained, physicians typically weigh family wishes and subjective
considerations heavily when evaluating when care is ―futile.‖223 A disaster
will reverse this calculus, however, ―so that the weight is on objective
prognostic criteria and less on subjective and individual patient factors.‖224
As some scholars have recognized, however, ―[i]f the anti-disability
discrimination laws mean anything, they mean that a treatment that is
provided to someone who will not be disabled after treatment cannot be
denied to someone who will be disabled.‖225 Because quality of life
determinations are inherently subjective and may be based on biased
assumptions concerning life with disabilities, they are unlikely to survive a
challenge under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.226

HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 15 (1999) (arguing that in constructing an ethical orientation to the use of
genetic testing, scholars must recognize that ―[a]dvances in the diagnosis and treatment of genetic
disorders may rapidly change perceptions of what counts as a genetic disease or disability‖); cf.
Rosamund Scott, The Uncertain Scope of Reproductive Autonomy in Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 13 MED. L. REV. 291, 311 (detailing a sliding scale of defects
that might be considered ―serious‖ under English abortion law, based in part on ―‗the probability of
effective treatment, either in utero or after birth‘‖).
221. Cf. Hahn, supra note 11, at 101 (describing the ―common tendency to confuse disability
with impairments . . . and to concentrate on clinical examinations that tend to exclude the analysis
of problems outside the boundaries of the human organism‖).
222. See, e.g., id. at 111 (―[D]isabled persons do not experience the external environment in
the same way as the nondisabled. The focus of attention is different; the concentration of energy is
different; the impressions formed in personal interactions are different; and the analysis of political
problems may reflect this differenced vantage point.‖); see also Adrienne Asch, Disability, Equality
and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 332 (2003) (―Life
with nearly all disability potentially contains rewarding personal relationships, stimulation and
discovery, self-development, and contributions to others.‖).
223. Hick et al., supra note 52, at 2.
224. Id. This position ignores the well-documented challenges to defining the concept of
futility, even on the basis of objective, empirically based data. Paul R. Helft et al., The Rise and
Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293–96 (2000).
225. Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., When Do Health Care Decisions Discriminate Against
Persons with Disabilities?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL‘Y & L. 1385, 1396 (1997).
226. Several disability advocacy groups have argued that ―any decision not to treat based on
patient quality of life violates the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 (ADA).‖ Philip G.
Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability Rights Laws, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 798, 806 (1997) (describing positions adopted by the director of the Center on
Disability and Health and counsel for the National Legal Center for the Disabled and Dependent).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 5

758

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

E. Exclusions Based on Medical Effectiveness
Although there is little question that precluding individuals with
specific disabilities from receiving critical health care in public health
emergencies raises legal concerns, it is less clear whether limiting
treatment more generally to those who are most likely to benefit from it
would implicate the ADA. This raises the issue not of quality of life posttreatment, but rather the response to treatment administered.
The legality of this approach is likely to lie in the definition of
―effectiveness‖ or ―medical benefit‖ employed in the protocols. Assessing
such terms will require decisionmakers both to evaluate the potential
outcomes of treatment and to place values on these outcomes.227 To the
extent that this evaluation is limited to the most basic question of whether
a particular patient will survive or receive a physiological benefit from
implementation of the scarce resource, using medical effectiveness or
benefit as allocation principles would seem consistent with the ADA.228
The Supreme Court in Choate required only that there be meaningful
access to health care under state policies.229 If there is scientifically sound
data suggesting that the individual is unlikely to survive for an appreciable
period of time despite access to the scarce resource, it would be reasonable
to conclude they are not ―qualified‖ for the benefit regardless of the source
of the incapacity.230 This is largely consistent with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission approach in the context of insurance plans that
deny coverage for disability-specific treatment. The Commission has stated
that the insurer may demonstrate the absence of subterfuge by ―prov[ing]
by reliable scientific evidence that the disability-specific treatment does not
cure the condition, slow the degeneration/deterioration or harm attributable
to the condition, alleviate the symptoms of the condition, or maintain the
current health status of individuals with the disability who receive the
treatment.‖231 To find otherwise, moreover, would call into question a
number of well-established and widely accepted medical practices in place
at the time the ADA was passed, such as the prioritization of heart
transplant recipients.232
227. Peters, supra note 198, at 500.
228. This type of evaluation is a strict definition of effectiveness, which has been endorsed as
ethically preferable compared to looser definitions in the ongoing debates of medical ―futility.‖
Bernard Lo, Futile Interventions, in RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 69,
69–71 (4th ed. 2009) (citations therein).
229. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303–04 (1985).
230. See Peters, supra note 198, at 514–15 (discussing findings by other authors).
231. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM‘N, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS
IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 14–15 (1993), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/pol
icy/docs/guidance.pdf.
232. See Peters, supra note 198, at 522. Individuals with underlying disabilities that are likely
to reduce the recipient‘s odds of survival post-transplant are given a lower priority ranking for a
transplant. Id.; see also Merrikin & Overcast, supra note 178, at 15 (―[T]he Rehabilitation Act does
not prohibit reasonable and necessary physiologically—or mentally—based requirements of a
transplantation program, even if they result in the exclusion of some handicapped individuals.‖).
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There is no question that some preexisting disabilities will make it
more difficult for individuals to fight and survive unrelated illnesses, and
therefore, such standards will exclude some individuals with disabilities
from receiving care.233 Nevertheless, such criteria are facially neutral and
involve the individualized consideration missing from the categorical
denials that run afoul of the ADA. Unlike subjective interpretations
regarding quality of life, the use of medical effectiveness in this manner is
not based on stereotypes, generalizations, or myths about disabilities. As
HHS reasoned in assessing the Oregon Plan, it should be permissible to
consider ―the cost of medical procedures, the length of hospital stays,
prevention of death, and prevention of contagious diseases,‖ as well as
―any content neutral factor that does not take disability into account or that
does not have a particular exclusionary effect on persons with
disabilities.‖234 In the absence of a strict first-come, first-served policy, the
ability of the individual to immediately gain from implementation of the
intervention or, more basically, to survive its application would seem to be
the most neutral criteria, although nevertheless imperfect, for distributing
resources in times of crises. It also most easily tracks the logic in those
cases which conclude that denial of medical treatment is not reachable by
the ADA. In such circumstances, it would be strained to conclude that the
medical care is denied ―because of‖ the disability. Instead, the denial is
based on the individual‘s functional medical status and poor odds of
surviving the immediate application of the intervention.
Under this logic, the use of SOFA scores to allocate resources would
seem permissible under the ADA. There is scientific evidence to suggest
that that SOFA scores are ―reliable predictors of outcome throughout the
ICU stay.‖235 Of critical significance, this assessment allocates care based
on the patient‘s current functional operation rather than disability status per
se. Access here is equal to the extent that anyone with a similar score
would be eligible for the intervention. Although individuals with severe
disabilities may ultimately be less likely to achieve an acceptable score,
this would seem the quintessential case where courts should defer to the
medical expertise of professionals. In a critical time of limited resources, it
is unlikely that courts would require physicians to administer life-saving
resources to those with no chance of recovery or risk violating the ADA.
Through the use of SOFA scores, the ADA‘s mandate of equal access to
health care is preserved, while equal outcomes are not.
If ―effectiveness‖ or ―benefit‖ is defined in such a way as to prefer
individuals with no preexisting medical disorders, however, it may once
again run afoul of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Protocols that
consider duration of benefit to the patient in allocating care, for example,
necessarily will exclude patients with preexisting diseases whether or not
233. See Peters, supra note 198, at 500 (―When a disability-related comorbidity causes poorer
outcomes, reliance on outcomes to allocate medical care would disfavor care of the affected
disabled patients.‖).
234. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 199, at 411.
235. See Ferreira et al., supra note 49, at 1757.
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such diseases are related to the current medical crisis. If a preexisting
disability is likely to shorten the individual‘s life span despite treatment,
the care would be less likely to be provided whether or not the medical
intervention is likely to be successful. Thus, any individual with a
preexisting disability that will shorten lifespan, significantly or otherwise,
is automatically disfavored from receiving treatment. Of particular
concern, there is no clear line-drawing in such models between the shortand long-term.
One protocol, for example, suggests that individuals with ―[s]evere
underlying disease with poor short-term prognosis‖ would likely be denied
a ventilator, while individuals with ―[n]o severe underlying disease‖ would
likely receive one.236 Falling in the indeterminate range in this plan are
those with severe underlying diseases who have ―poor long-term prognosis
and/or ongoing resource demand.‖237 This same type of assessment
derailed the legitimacy of the Oregon Plan. That plan‘s assessment of the
―net benefit‖ of any treatment was found to be suspect because it disvalued
a ―treatment whenever a patient remains disabled after treatment—even if
the treatment is not intended to restore those functions, causes no burdens
such as pain or disorientation, and is effective in what it is intended to
do.‖238 As a result, ―[t]he likelihood that patient will function at a lower
level of ability after treatment should be irrelevant to any measure of the
treatment‘s effectiveness if the treatment does not itself cause the loss of
ability and is not intended to restore that ability.‖239 By the same token, an
individual with a shortened life expectancy because of a disability should
not be denied treatment that will restore functioning but have no effect on
life expectancy. To conclude otherwise improperly introduces into the
analysis subjective assessments about the value of life with disabilities,
similar to the quality of life discussion detailed earlier.
It is possible, however, to consider duration of benefit to the patient in
a more neutral and limited way. Some scholars have argued, for example,
that ―providers ought to be permitted to prefer the patient who is
reasonably expected to obtain the same benefit as another patient for a
longer duration, such as more years of life, as long as the benefit is not
measured in terms of quality of life‖ in situations involving limited
resources.240 The ―benefit‖ in this model is objective to the extent that an
extra day of life expectancy is weighted equally for all individuals, whether
or not they have an underlying disability. On its face, this approach allows
equal access to care for both individuals with disabilities and those
without.
It is again debatable, however, whether a standard that functionally
precludes entire categories of people with disabilities from receiving health
236. Hick et al., supra note 52, at 222 fig.1.
237. Id.
238. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 199, at 404 (quoting Letter
from Marzen & Avila, Dec. 5, supra note 200).
239. Id.
240. Mehlman et al., supra note 225, at 1402.
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care in times of emergency can equate with ―meaningful access‖ as
understood in Choate. Anyone with a fatal disease would likely be
precluded from care in times of scarcity, even if the effects of the disease
are unlikely to manifest for many years. Because life expectancy
calculations lack scientific precision, moreover, this method leaves the
door open to discriminatory animus in allocating care. Is it likely, for
example, that a mentally retarded young adult would be provided with a
ventilator before an otherwise healthy older adult, provided there was some
scientific evidence suggesting that the former would live for a longer time
period than the latter, however brief? If the provision of a ventilator to one
potentially results in death to the other, the imprecise nature of life
expectancy calculations allows them to be adjusted accordingly.
F. Potential Defenses Available Under Federal Law
It is not sufficient to conclude that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
apply to the allocation protocols or to identify the discriminatory
implications of some of their provisions. The protocols may nevertheless
be lawful if they are ―necessary‖ within the meaning of the ADA, such that
the modification or removal of the identified criteria would constitute a
fundamental alteration to the provision of emergent care in a pandemic.241
As other scholars have noted, these terms ―are sufficiently elastic to permit
judicial consideration of . . . important ethical issues‖ involved in rationing
health care.242 The necessity of an eligibility requirement will depend, in
part, on its ―importance to the program‘s ability to meet its targeted
goals.‖243 Courts have found proposed modifications to fundamentally alter
programs when they ―would endanger a program‘s viability, would cause
massive financial expenditures, would jeopardize the effectiveness or
involve a major restructuring of a program, or would result in the creation
of a new program.‖244
Proponents of the protocols are likely to argue that the use of disability
as exclusionary criteria is necessary because protocols ―must rely on a
limited set of objective criteria that do not require any laboratory data or
other investigations‖ to be effective in times of crisis.245 An emergency
requires decisionmaking and assessment on short time frames with
incomplete information. There is no question that a disability diagnosis is
shorthand for myriad conditions experienced by the individual that may be
relevant to treatment decisions. If the use of diagnostic categories is the
only or even the best way to facilitate decisionmaking in situations
241. See infra Part V.B.
242. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 198, at 509.
243. Crossley, supra note 138, at 233.
244. Smith, supra note 140, § 6.
245. Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 53S. The Task Force protocol recognizes that such is
the case when triage decisions are made in the ―prehospital field.‖ Id. The protocol distinguishes
this scenario from ―tertiary triage [that] is conducted within the hospital and deals with decisions
such as disposition to the operating room in trauma scenarios or to critical care areas, as is the focus
of this working group.‖ Id.
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requiring immediate action, courts may logically conclude that they are
necessary to the efficient distribution of resources. By the same token, it
would fundamentally alter the provision of care in public health
emergencies to preclude their use.246 Requiring an individualized
determination in every case could conceivably ―deny the validity of the
State‘s focus on the collective welfare of its citizens‖ in times of scarce
resources.247 Because ―a disaster will severely strain human and financial
resources,‖ any requirement imposed by the judiciary may automatically
appear proportionately more burdensome and unwieldy.248
Supporting this interpretation is Choate‘s recognition of the tension
between the sweeping mandate of the ADA and ―the desire to keep [the
statute] within manageable bounds.‖249 Given courts‘ general reluctance to
intrude into the realm of medical decisionmaking, a public health crisis of
widespread magnitude would seem a prime area where a ―hands off‖
approach might be urged, at least with respect to any protocols
promulgated by the state.250 This practical perspective is coupled with the
legal reality that the ADA does not always require an individualized
inquiry. Broader classifications are permitted at times by courts when
―substantially all excluded persons are unqualified‖ for the treatment in
question or when it is highly impracticable to do otherwise.251 If there is
evidence to suggest a statistically sound correlation between a disability
category and the absence of patient benefit, precluding categorical
exclusions based on disability could potentially both hamper the state‘s
ability to administer scarce resources and provide little benefit to
individuals with disabilities.252
246. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Altered Standards of Care for Health Care Providers
in the Pandemic Influenza, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (concluding that in the context of
public health emergencies, ―[T]he goal of providing optimal care to the population may require
compromising best practices or providing less than optimal care to individual patients. This
approach, ethically intolerable or legally suspect under normal conditions, may be necessary and
appropriate under disaster scenarios.‖).
247. Crossley, supra note 138, at 237. As Dean Crossley has argued, deference to private
hospital or association triage rankings would be significantly less compelling than a priority list
developed by the state—hospitals do not ―traditionally‖ play the role of making value judgments
in the face of scarce resources as does the state. Id. at 249.
248. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1524.
249. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985).
250. See Crossley, supra note 138, at 240 (―From the State‘s perspective, this need to keep
disability discrimination laws within ‗manageable bounds‘ becomes particularly acute when those
laws are invoked to inhibit a state‘s ability to establish priorities in allocating scarce resources.‖).
251. Peters, supra note 198, at 508. Professor Philip G. Peters Jr. concludes that ―[t]he greater
the percentage of excluded persons whose outcomes are likely to be significantly better than the cutoff, the less likely it is that a disability-based criterion will survive scrutiny.‖ Id. at 532. Courts
would determine whether a practice is highly impracticable based on factors ―such as the
availability of better predictive data, the cost of acquiring it, and the administrative difficulty of
using it.‖ Id.
252. See Crossley, supra note 138, at 227–28. It also could conceivably open the door to the
argument endorsed by the Olmstead plurality that modifying a program may constitute a
fundamental alteration where ―the allocation of available resources [suggests that] immediate relief
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This approach, however, is undercut by the language of the ADA and
Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations. The DOJ has explained that
―neutral‖ eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals
with disabilities are permissible when they ―are necessary for [the] safe
operation‖ of the program.253 From this, some courts have concluded that
necessity is not a defense to ―overt denials of equal treatment of
individuals with disabilities.‖254 Other courts have similarly concluded that
the fundamental alteration test is inapplicable to cases alleging disparate
treatment, reasoning ―[p]ublic entities could evade the ADA by claiming it
would fundamentally alter their program to eliminate a facially
discriminatory provision of a challenged program, and Congress‘s intent in
enacting the ADA would be defeated.‖255 Under this line of reasoning,
there is no defense applicable that would excuse the categorical exclusion
of individuals with disabilities from receiving care.
As for those protocol provisions that would more appropriately be
challenged on the ground of disparate impact—quality of life, duration of
need, duration of benefit, and medical effectiveness—the answer to
whether they are necessary to providing health care in a public health
emergency depends on whether the public health maxim of the greatest
good for the greatest number is in fact a legitimate and primary goal of the
state in times of crisis. Stated differently, courts must determine ―whether
the objective of maximizing health outcomes is an ‗essential‘ program
objective within the meaning of the equal opportunity laws.‖256 A number
of scholars have concluded that criteria that will maximize the
effectiveness of health outcomes are both ―essential‖ and ―necessary‖ and
thus permissible under the ADA.257 Still, others have concluded that ―the
use of effectiveness criteria is vital to the goal of maximizing health
outcomes from fixed resources.‖258
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to conclude that protocol criteria
based on generalizations, stereotypes, or myths about people with
for the plaintiffs would be inequitable.‖ Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999)
(plurality opinion). Notably, however, an important distinction may be drawn between the
allocation protocols and the integration mandate at issue in Olmstead. Whereas a delay in moving to
an integrated setting, while harmful, may be rectified in the future, the withholding of immediate
medical treatment may impose irreversible and potentially deadly consequences to people with
disabilities.
253. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130 (2010); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.301.
254. Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 939 F. Supp. 765, 770 (D. Haw. 1996).
255. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002); see also New Directions
Treatment Serv. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 305 (3d Cir. 2007) (―We . . . agree that it is
inappropriate to apply the ‗reasonable modification‘ test to facially discriminatory laws.‖); MX
Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2002); Bay Area Addiction Research &
Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999); G. ex rel. K. v. Hawaii, 676
F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056 (D. Haw. 2009).
256. Peters, supra note 198, at 510.
257. Id. at 515 (discussing scholarly opinions on the issue and concluding that they ―reflect the
assumption that society can and should consider the effectiveness of a medical treatment‖).
258. Id. at 518.
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disabilities are legally necessary to the effective administration of
resources. Quality of life assessments, in particular, are unlikely to meet
this standard. Even if the court endorses the legitimacy of the ―greatest
good‖ approach, the answer of which treatment provides the ―greatest‖
result depends on a value assessment of the lives to be saved. There is no
way to perform this assessment without reference to generalizations about
life with disabilities, particularly in times of crisis when treatment
decisions are likely to be made under time pressure.
Outside of this recognition, however, it is unlikely that either existing
case law or the text of the ADA will clearly answer whether such terms are
necessary. In an ideal world, Congress would step in to answer the
legitimacy of this approach and its consistency with the ADA. In the
absence of such measures, however, courts are likely to turn to the ethical
implications of adopting this approach in evaluating its legality. The next
Part explores these issues in detail.
V. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCE PROTOCOLS
The foregoing analysis suggests that at least components of the existing
allocation protocols violate the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. But that
analysis does not end the inquiry. Some might argue that the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act were not intended to apply to emergency circumstances.
The conflict between the allocation protocols and antidiscrimination laws
may not suggest that the allocation protocols are wrong, but rather that the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act need to be amended to allow exceptions
during public health emergencies, similar to the exceptions under
Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and EMTALA.259 Accordingly, this Part
examines the underlying ethical justification for the components of the
allocation protocols. In doing so, this Part seeks to elucidate ethical
arguments not addressed in the preceding legal analysis of the allocation
protocols under the anti-discrimination laws. Laws often reflect a floor,
articulating the minimum standard of behavior to which society members
must conform—whereas ethical principles are more aspirational,
describing how members ought to behave; in some instances, however, the
law and ethics are more closely aligned. That is the case here. The goal of
these antidiscrimination laws was to ensure equal opportunities to persons
with disabilities to remedy historic discrimination and prejudice against
people with disabilities that precluded them from fully participating in
society.260 Thus, these laws represent society‘s moral commitment to
treating persons with disabilities with respect and affording them justice
that was previously denied, and legal analysis of these laws necessarily
involves consideration of the underlying ethical principles reflected in
them.

259. See supra Part III.B.
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (West 2010).
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A. Categorical Exclusion of People with Disabilities from
Critical Care
Categorical exclusion of people with disabilities from critical care in
public health emergencies poses the clearest conflict with antidiscrimination laws and the greatest ethical concern. While the allocation
protocols undeniably adhere to the public health principle of maximizing
population health, this categorical exclusion violates several other ethical
principles. Most clearly, it violates the principle of justice, which demands
equitable distribution of goods within society. While there is disagreement
about what constitutes equitable distribution, there is general agreement
that inequitable treatment requires justification.261 In public health,
inequitable distribution generally is justified when such distribution is
required to alleviate existing inequities.262 But the categorical exclusions
articulated in the allocation protocols do not alleviate existing inequities,
but rather disadvantage an already disadvantaged group. Moreover, as
discussed previously, the excluded categories are so broad that they cannot
be interpreted as representing anything other than an exclusion based on a
devalued status.263 In this regard, categorical exclusion violates other core
principles that public health actions be necessary and effective and be the
least restrictive alternative.264
That categorical exclusion violates federal antidiscrimination laws
lends support to this ethical analysis. Categorically excluding the disabled
from critical care is inconsistent with the moral commitment to them
reflected in those laws. Moreover, as described earlier, the steps the
government has taken to address the needs of the disabled during a public
health emergency demonstrate its intention to meet that commitment, even
in the context of an emergency.265 If ―[a] nation‘s greatness is measured by
how it treats its weakest members,‖266 then abandoning this commitment to
the disabled during the time of greatest need would evidence a moral
weakness.

261. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 20, at 120–81 (discussing various
theories of autonomy used in health care decisionmaking and justifying the obligation to solicit and
respect patients‘ decisions).
262. See Kass, supra note 23, at 1781; see also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1511–12.
263. See supra Part IV.B.
264. Part of the rationale for and appeal of the categorical exclusion is the relative ease of
application during a public health emergency. More nuanced evaluation may not be possible under
such circumstances. However, public health ethics—and law—do not support use of such broad and
unsupported categories.
265. See supra Part III.B.
266. Stefan Parry Carmien & Gerhard Fischer, Design, Adoption, and Assessment of a SocioTechnical Environment Supporting Independence for Persons with Cognitive Disabilities, CHI 2008
PROCEEDINGS—BEYOND END-USER PROGRAMMING 597 (Apr. 5–10, 2008) (quoting Mohandas
Gandhi).
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B. Exclusions Based on Likely Duration of Care Needed
The rationale for exclusion based on durational limits suggested by
some allocation protocols, from a public health perspective, is that more
people may benefit (i.e., receive care and survive) if health care providers
do not commit scarce resources to those who are going to need that
resource for a longer period. 267 The justification for such limits depends on
the quality of the data to support them; the public health principle of
effectiveness requires scientific evidence to support the assumptions about
differential survival outcomes. As discussed earlier, there are reasons to be
concerned that this criterion will devolve into subjective evaluations
regarding quality and value of life with a disability that will disadvantage
those with disabilities in ways that are ethically suspect.268 In this regard,
the durational limits would raise similar ethical concerns as the categorical
exclusions,269 but with the added problem that these decisions are hidden
in the mantle of medical judgment, rather than being open and transparent.
Thus, consideration of duration of care may result in people with
disabilities receiving less care during a pandemic, even if they would be
likely to survive the pandemic were they to receive the care.
On the other hand, some allocation protocols exclude people from
critical care based on the intensity of care beyond necessary ventilation.
That is, people who need other resources, such as nursing supervision
because of dementia or other disability, and are ―hard to care for‖ may be
prevented from receiving critical care.270 The underlying rationale for this
policy is that personnel often are scarce during an emergency because they
are sick themselves, must care for sick family members, or may be at
increased risk of infection because of their own health conditions (for
example, pregnancy or asthma), and that devoting personnel to one ―hard
to care for patient‖ means those personnel are not available to help others.
However, in this case, the patients who are excluded from care may have
medical needs and a likelihood of survival that is similar to that of other
patients. Such policies devalue those who have greater needs (i.e., the
disabled) and do not consider that there may be other ways for handling
their care. For example, this care may be provided by non-nursing hospital
staff or there may be family members or friends who could provide the
supportive care so that health care providers may devote their efforts to
medical care. Thus, such policies may not be necessary to achieve the
stated public health goal, and it is inappropriate to deprive such individuals
of care and of the chance for survival based simply on their greater care
needs because of their disability.

267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.C–D; infra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.A (describing the ethical concerns posed by categorical exclusions).
Christian et al., supra note 10, at 1378–79.
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C. Exclusions Based on Quality of Life Considerations
Even those groups that rely on the quality of life criterion in their
allocation protocols recognize its inherent subjectivity and potential for
abuse. That those advocating for its use feel the need to warn against the
dangers of this criterion in and of itself should give us pause. Why insert a
criterion that is inherently subjective into an already fraught decision under
circumstances that complicate thoughtful decisionmaking? The rationale
for considering quality of life in allocation decisions is to avoid using
scarce medical resources to support lives thought to be ―not worth living‖
when other lives could be saved.271 However, there is little societal
agreement regarding what is a life ―not worth living,‖ as demonstrated by
public debates on preimplantation genetic diagnosis, abortion, and
withdrawal of life support.272 Thus, for the reasons previously articulated,
allocation of medical resources on the basis of quality of life assessments is
ethically suspect.273 Allocating scarce medical resources based on quality
of life considerations also violates core principles of public health ethics
because it disadvantages an already vulnerable group and the decisions are
unsupported (and unsupportable) by data.274 Indeed, such decisions are
close to the rejected concept of ―social worth‖ as an allocation principle.275
The biases the quality of life criterion introduces into decisionmaking
warrant rejecting it as a criterion. However, involving a broader range of
perspectives in the development of allocation proposals could limit bias.
To date, the discussions have primarily been driven by clinicians.276 While
the groups have published their work in keeping with the ethical principle
of transparency, publication has been limited to medical literature.
Proposals have not been widely discussed in the disability community or
271. Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One’s Child
Genetically, 25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 9 (1996)
272. See, e.g., id. (arguing that there is an ethical obligation for a parent to avoid having a
child with a disability). But see Asch, supra note 209, at 1652 (arguing that such a view devalues
the lives of persons with disabilities and arguing for a broader view of a satisfying life for a disabled
person). Indeed, the dispute between Terri Schiavo‘s husband and parents that launched her case
into the public eye, and the public debates that followed, shows quite vividly the lack of agreement
regarding what is a life worth living, including disputes among medical professionals. See C.
Christopher Hook & Paul S. Mueller, The Terri Schiavo Saga: The Making of a Tragedy and
Lessons Learned, 80 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1449, 1450–51 (2005).
273. See supra Part IV.D.
274. See Kass, supra note 23, at 1780–81.
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. The groups have been comprised primarily of clinicians, although the Task Force had one
lawyer on it. Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 64S. The NY Workgroup included several lawyers
and ethicists. Powell et al., supra note 64, at 20. We were unable to identify anyone from the
disability community, although it is possible that some members of the groups were disabled
themselves or had experience with disability through a family member or friend. Others have called
for broader public debate of allocation proposals. See, e.g., White et al., supra note 29, at 137
(calling for a robust public engagement process that ―engage[s] a representative sample of citizens,
rather than those with the knowledge and resources to seek out the draft guidelines on the
Internet‖).
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literature. Expanding the discussion to the disabled, among others, would
be essential to evaluating whether such a criterion could be specified to
limit the inherent bias discussed here.
D. Exclusions Based on Medical Effectiveness
Several ethical principles support the use of a medical effectiveness as
a criterion for allocating medical resources during a public health
emergency. The clearest support comes from the ethical principle that
public health interventions must be effective. Under this principle, not only
is there no obligation to provide ineffective interventions, public health
authorities are constrained from using ineffective interventions. As noted
earlier, however, the justification for using ―medical effectiveness‖ may
vary with its definition.277 A stricter definition, which focuses closely on
whether the medical intervention results in the expected physiologic
response, is easiest to defend because it does not allow quality of life
decisions in through the back door.
General ethical principles of governance and stewardship support
consideration of medical effectiveness. Under these principles, public or
scarce resources should not be wasted, as they would if they were put to
ineffective medical treatment. Some might argue that a stricter definition
of medical effectiveness that is related to short-term medical outcomes,
may ―waste‖ scarce resources if they are used for disabled people who may
not survive as long as others who are without disabilities. Importantly,
however, the principle of effectiveness, legally and ethically, does not
require use of the most effective option. Other principles may require
choosing a less effective option; for example, the most effective option
from a public health perspective (i.e., maximizes population health) may
significantly infringe on individual interests, whereas a slightly less
effective option might achieve almost as much good, without the burden on
individual interests. In such a case, it would be ethically preferable to select
the second, less effective option because it better balances the public health
goal with competing individual interests.278 Following the same logic, in
the case of allocation of scarce resources in a public health emergency, a
definition of medical effectiveness that limits disabled people‘s access to
critical care medicine because of their long-term health and life
expectancies violates the principle of distributive justice and society‘s
moral commitments to providing people with equal opportunities. A
stricter (if not the strictest) definition of medical effectiveness better
balances these competing moral commitments and ethical principles.

277. See supra Part IV.E.
278. Indeed, such evaluations have been used to justify voluntary, universal HIV screening of
pregnant women over mandatory programs. INST. OF MED., REDUCING THE ODDS: PREVENTING
PERINATAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV IN THE UNITED STATES 109–13 (Michael A. Stoto et al. eds.,
1999); see also Kass, supra note 23, at 1780.
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E. Additional Considerations
The foregoing ethical analysis focuses on the primary components of
the allocation protocols that also have ADA or Rehabilitation Act
implications. The protocols have other criteria that raise other implications.
For example, some protocols exclude based on advanced age,279 whereas
others specifically reject using age as an exclusion criteria.280 Still, others
argue for use of multiple principles, including the life-cycle principle that
would take life-stage into account.281 Others rely on a principle of firstcome, first-served in the limited context in which the criteria of ―[o]rgan
system function (and severity of impairment) [; d]uration of ventilator use
and duration of benefit[;] . . . [and r]esponse to a trial of mechanical
ventilation (if received[ )]‖ do not resolve the allocation decision.282 Public
health ethics provide support for use of some of these criteria,283 but, as
with the allocation components discussed herein, they should be subject to
public discussion and debate. Ultimately, allocation protocols for public
health emergencies will only succeed if the public accepts them as
reasonable and fair.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that advance planning for public heath emergencies must
take place, and that it must be done within the parameters of
antidiscrimination laws. These issues cannot await resolution by the
courts—the application of these protocols will be made in the field when
timing is critical. If these issues are not debated openly and collectively in
advance, they are likely to be resolved covertly by individuals in times of
crises. At the point of litigation, moreover, individuals with disabilities
will already be irreversibly harmed.284 Jurors and the judiciary are likely to
be more heavily influenced by the chaos surrounding a time of emergency
and the need for the government to mount a quick response than they
would be swayed by the civil rights of individuals at that time. The
protection to be afforded, therefore, must come on the front end of the
planning process.
A public health emergency will necessitate hard decisions. Public
health authorities and medical professionals need clear guidance so that
they can make good decisions under bad circumstances. For protocols to
successfully alleviate some of the uncertainty in times of public health
crises, moreover, their necessity must be understood and embraced by the
279. Christian et al., supra note 10, at 1379; Devereaux et al., supra note 6, at 60S tbl.6.
280. Powell et al., supra note 64, at 23.
281. White et al., supra note 29, at 135–37.
282. Hick et al., supra note 52, at 4–6 (noting how to make a determination regarding who
should get ventilator support when one patient has received it, a second patient arrives in need of
ventilator support, and no other ventilators are available; the fact that the first patient was first
becomes relevant to decisionmaking if the other three factors do not demonstrate a ―clear-cut
difference‖ preferring one patient over the other).
283. See supra Part II.A.
284. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1538–39.
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public, particularly those who are likely to be most significantly impacted
by them. The real power of the ADA and § 504 lies not in their ability to
punish misconduct, but in the guidance they provide in the development
and implementation of equitable policies for people with disabilities.285 It
is the authors‘ hope that this Article will move the essential process of
planning for public health emergencies forward by providing a framework
for thinking critically about existing plans and developing new plans that
are more in keeping with society‘s moral commitment to equal access.

285. See Anderlik & Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 1197 (―Law is as much a means of
structuring behavior as it is a means of punishing misbehavior.‖).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/5

52

